First compiling version of per-block-proc refactor

This commit is contained in:
Paul Hauner
2019-03-06 15:22:45 +11:00
parent a15ed0acd3
commit 40f74c9b26
20 changed files with 907 additions and 586 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
use crate::errors::{AttestationInvalid as Invalid, AttestationValidationError as Error};
use ssz::TreeHash;
use types::beacon_state::helpers::*;
use types::*;
/// Validate an attestation, checking the aggregate signature.
///
/// Spec v0.4.0
pub fn validate_attestation(
state: &BeaconState,
attestation: &Attestation,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
validate_attestation_signature_optional(state, attestation, spec, true)
}
/// Validate an attestation, without checking the aggregate signature.
///
/// Spec v0.4.0
pub fn validate_attestation_without_signature(
state: &BeaconState,
attestation: &Attestation,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
validate_attestation_signature_optional(state, attestation, spec, false)
}
/// Validate an attestation, optionally checking the aggregate signature.
///
/// Spec v0.4.0
fn validate_attestation_signature_optional(
state: &BeaconState,
attestation: &Attestation,
spec: &ChainSpec,
verify_signature: bool,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
// Verify that `attestation.data.slot >= GENESIS_SLOT`.
verify!(
attestation.data.slot >= spec.genesis_slot,
Invalid::PreGenesis
);
// Verify that `attestation.data.slot + MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY <= state.slot`.
verify!(
attestation.data.slot + spec.min_attestation_inclusion_delay <= state.slot,
Invalid::IncludedTooEarly
);
// Verify that `state.slot < attestation.data.slot + SLOTS_PER_EPOCH`.
verify!(
state.slot < attestation.data.slot + spec.slots_per_epoch,
Invalid::IncludedTooLate
);
// Verify that `attestation.data.justified_epoch` is equal to `state.justified_epoch` if
// `slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot + 1) >= get_current_epoch(state) else
// state.previous_justified_epoch`.
if (attestation.data.slot + 1).epoch(spec.slots_per_epoch) >= state.current_epoch(spec) {
verify!(
attestation.data.justified_epoch == state.justified_epoch,
Invalid::WrongJustifiedSlot
);
} else {
verify!(
attestation.data.justified_epoch == state.previous_justified_epoch,
Invalid::WrongJustifiedSlot
);
}
// Verify that `attestation.data.justified_block_root` is equal to `get_block_root(state,
// get_epoch_start_slot(attestation.data.justified_epoch))`.
verify!(
attestation.data.justified_block_root
== *state
.get_block_root(
attestation
.data
.justified_epoch
.start_slot(spec.slots_per_epoch),
&spec
)
.ok_or(BeaconStateError::InsufficientBlockRoots)?,
Invalid::WrongJustifiedRoot
);
// Verify that either:
//
// (i)`state.latest_crosslinks[attestation.data.shard] == attestation.data.latest_crosslink`,
//
// (ii) `state.latest_crosslinks[attestation.data.shard] ==
// Crosslink(crosslink_data_root=attestation.data.crosslink_data_root,
// epoch=slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot))`.
let potential_crosslink = Crosslink {
crosslink_data_root: attestation.data.crosslink_data_root,
epoch: attestation.data.slot.epoch(spec.slots_per_epoch),
};
verify!(
(attestation.data.latest_crosslink
== state.latest_crosslinks[attestation.data.shard as usize])
| (state.latest_crosslinks[attestation.data.shard as usize] == potential_crosslink),
Invalid::BadLatestCrosslinkRoot
);
// Get the committee for this attestation
let (committee, _shard) = state
.get_crosslink_committees_at_slot(attestation.data.slot, spec)?
.iter()
.find(|(_committee, shard)| *shard == attestation.data.shard)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(Invalid::NoCommitteeForShard))?;
// Custody bitfield is all zeros (phase 0 requirement).
verify!(
attestation.custody_bitfield.num_set_bits() == 0,
Invalid::CustodyBitfieldHasSetBits
);
// Custody bitfield length is correct.
verify!(
verify_bitfield_length(&attestation.aggregation_bitfield, committee.len()),
Invalid::BadCustodyBitfieldLength
);
// Aggregation bitfield isn't empty.
verify!(
attestation.aggregation_bitfield.num_set_bits() != 0,
Invalid::AggregationBitfieldIsEmpty
);
// Aggregation bitfield length is correct.
verify!(
verify_bitfield_length(&attestation.aggregation_bitfield, committee.len()),
Invalid::BadAggregationBitfieldLength
);
if verify_signature {
let attestation_epoch = attestation.data.slot.epoch(spec.slots_per_epoch);
verify!(
verify_attestation_signature(
state,
committee,
attestation_epoch,
&attestation.custody_bitfield,
&attestation.data,
&attestation.aggregate_signature,
spec
),
Invalid::BadSignature
);
}
// [TO BE REMOVED IN PHASE 1] Verify that `attestation.data.crosslink_data_root == ZERO_HASH`.
verify!(
attestation.data.crosslink_data_root == spec.zero_hash,
Invalid::ShardBlockRootNotZero
);
Ok(())
}
/// Verifies an aggregate signature for some given `AttestationData`, returning `true` if the
/// `aggregate_signature` is valid.
///
/// Returns `false` if:
/// - `aggregate_signature` was not signed correctly.
/// - `custody_bitfield` does not have a bit for each index of `committee`.
/// - A `validator_index` in `committee` is not in `state.validator_registry`.
///
/// Spec v0.4.0
fn verify_attestation_signature(
state: &BeaconState,
committee: &[usize],
attestation_epoch: Epoch,
custody_bitfield: &Bitfield,
attestation_data: &AttestationData,
aggregate_signature: &AggregateSignature,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> bool {
let mut aggregate_pubs = vec![AggregatePublicKey::new(); 2];
let mut message_exists = vec![false; 2];
for (i, v) in committee.iter().enumerate() {
let custody_bit = match custody_bitfield.get(i) {
Ok(bit) => bit,
// Invalidate signature if custody_bitfield.len() < committee
Err(_) => return false,
};
message_exists[custody_bit as usize] = true;
match state.validator_registry.get(*v as usize) {
Some(validator) => {
aggregate_pubs[custody_bit as usize].add(&validator.pubkey);
}
// Invalidate signature if validator index is unknown.
None => return false,
};
}
// Message when custody bitfield is `false`
let message_0 = AttestationDataAndCustodyBit {
data: attestation_data.clone(),
custody_bit: false,
}
.hash_tree_root();
// Message when custody bitfield is `true`
let message_1 = AttestationDataAndCustodyBit {
data: attestation_data.clone(),
custody_bit: true,
}
.hash_tree_root();
let mut messages = vec![];
let mut keys = vec![];
// If any validator signed a message with a `false` custody bit.
if message_exists[0] {
messages.push(&message_0[..]);
keys.push(&aggregate_pubs[0]);
}
// If any validator signed a message with a `true` custody bit.
if message_exists[1] {
messages.push(&message_1[..]);
keys.push(&aggregate_pubs[1]);
}
let domain = spec.get_domain(attestation_epoch, Domain::Attestation, &state.fork);
aggregate_signature.verify_multiple(&messages[..], domain, &keys[..])
}