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Update to frozen spec ❄️ (v0.8.1) (#444)

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* types: first updates for v0.8

* state_processing: epoch processing v0.8.0

* state_processing: block processing v0.8.0

* tree_hash_derive: support generics in SignedRoot

* types v0.8: update to use ssz_types

* state_processing v0.8: use ssz_types

* ssz_types: add bitwise methods and from_elem

* types: fix v0.8 FIXMEs

* ssz_types: add bitfield shift_up

* ssz_types: iterators and DerefMut for VariableList

* types,state_processing: use VariableList

* ssz_types: fix BitVector Decode impl

Fixed a typo in the implementation of ssz::Decode for BitVector, which caused it
to be considered variable length!

* types: fix test modules for v0.8 update

* types: remove slow type-level arithmetic

* state_processing: fix tests for v0.8

* op_pool: update for v0.8

* ssz_types: Bitfield difference length-independent

Allow computing the difference of two bitfields of different lengths.

* Implement compact committee support

* epoch_processing: committee & active index roots

* state_processing: genesis state builder v0.8

* state_processing: implement v0.8.1

* Further improve tree_hash

* Strip examples, tests from cached_tree_hash

* Update TreeHash, un-impl CachedTreeHash

* Update bitfield TreeHash, un-impl CachedTreeHash

* Update FixedLenVec TreeHash, unimpl CachedTreeHash

* Update update tree_hash_derive for new TreeHash

* Fix TreeHash, un-impl CachedTreeHash for ssz_types

* Remove fixed_len_vec, ssz benches

SSZ benches relied upon fixed_len_vec -- it is easier to just delete
them and rebuild them later (when necessary)

* Remove boolean_bitfield crate

* Fix fake_crypto BLS compile errors

* Update ef_tests for new v.8 type params

* Update ef_tests submodule to v0.8.1 tag

* Make fixes to support parsing ssz ef_tests

* `compact_committee...` to `compact_committees...`

* Derive more traits for `CompactCommittee`

* Flip bitfield byte-endianness

* Fix tree_hash for bitfields

* Modify CLI output for ef_tests

* Bump ssz crate version

* Update ssz_types doc comment

* Del cached tree hash tests from ssz_static tests

* Tidy SSZ dependencies

* Rename ssz_types crate to eth2_ssz_types

* validator_client: update for v0.8

* ssz_types: update union/difference for bit order swap

* beacon_node: update for v0.8, EthSpec

* types: disable cached tree hash, update min spec

* state_processing: fix slot bug in committee update

* tests: temporarily disable fork choice harness test

See #447

* committee cache: prevent out-of-bounds access

In the case where we tried to access the committee of a shard that didn't have a committee in the
current epoch, we were accessing elements beyond the end of the shuffling vector and panicking! This
commit adds a check to make the failure safe and explicit.

* fix bug in get_indexed_attestation and simplify

There was a bug in our implementation of get_indexed_attestation whereby
incorrect "committee indices" were used to index into the custody bitfield. The
bug was only observable in the case where some bits of the custody bitfield were
set to 1. The implementation has been simplified to remove the bug, and a test
added.

* state_proc: workaround for compact committees bug

https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/issues/1315

* v0.8: updates to make the EF tests pass

* Remove redundant max operation checks.
* Always supply both messages when checking attestation signatures -- allowing
  verification of an attestation with no signatures.
* Swap the order of the fork and domain constant in `get_domain`, to match
  the spec.

* rustfmt

* ef_tests: add new epoch processing tests

* Integrate v0.8 into master (compiles)

* Remove unused crates, fix clippy lints

* Replace v0.6.3 tags w/ v0.8.1

* Remove old comment

* Ensure lmd ghost tests only run in release

* Update readme
This commit is contained in:
Michael Sproul
2019-07-30 12:44:51 +10:00
committed by Paul Hauner
parent 177df12149
commit a236003a7b
184 changed files with 3332 additions and 4542 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

17
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/block_processing_builder.rs
View File

@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ use types::*;
pub struct BlockProcessingBuilder<T: EthSpec> {
pub state_builder: TestingBeaconStateBuilder<T>,
pub block_builder: TestingBeaconBlockBuilder,
pub block_builder: TestingBeaconBlockBuilder<T>,
pub num_validators: usize,
}
@@ -36,15 +35,15 @@ impl<T: EthSpec> BlockProcessingBuilder<T> {
randao_sk: Option<SecretKey>,
previous_block_root: Option<Hash256>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> (BeaconBlock, BeaconState<T>) {
) -> (BeaconBlock<T>, BeaconState<T>) {
let (state, keypairs) = self.state_builder.build();
let builder = &mut self.block_builder;
builder.set_slot(state.slot);
match previous_block_root {
Some(root) => builder.set_previous_block_root(root),
None => builder.set_previous_block_root(Hash256::from_slice(
Some(root) => builder.set_parent_root(root),
None => builder.set_parent_root(Hash256::from_slice(
&state.latest_block_header.signed_root(),
)),
}
@@ -55,13 +54,11 @@ impl<T: EthSpec> BlockProcessingBuilder<T> {
let keypair = &keypairs[proposer_index];
match randao_sk {
Some(sk) => builder.set_randao_reveal::<T>(&sk, &state.fork, spec),
None => builder.set_randao_reveal::<T>(&keypair.sk, &state.fork, spec),
Some(sk) => builder.set_randao_reveal(&sk, &state.fork, spec),
None => builder.set_randao_reveal(&keypair.sk, &state.fork, spec),
}
let block = self
.block_builder
.build::<T>(&keypair.sk, &state.fork, spec);
let block = self.block_builder.build(&keypair.sk, &state.fork, spec);
(block, state)
}

67
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/errors.rs
View File

@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ pub enum BlockProcessingError {
Invalid(BlockInvalid),
/// Encountered a `BeaconStateError` whilst attempting to determine validity.
BeaconStateError(BeaconStateError),
/// Encountered an `ssz_types::Error` whilst attempting to determine validity.
SszTypesError(ssz_types::Error),
}
impl_from_beacon_state_error!(BlockProcessingError);
@@ -78,6 +80,7 @@ pub enum BlockInvalid {
MaxAttesterSlashingsExceed,
MaxProposerSlashingsExceeded,
DepositCountInvalid,
DuplicateTransfers,
MaxExitsExceeded,
MaxTransfersExceed,
AttestationInvalid(usize, AttestationInvalid),
@@ -92,6 +95,15 @@ pub enum BlockInvalid {
DepositProcessingFailed(usize),
ExitInvalid(usize, ExitInvalid),
TransferInvalid(usize, TransferInvalid),
// NOTE: this is only used in tests, normally a state root mismatch is handled
// in the beacon_chain rather than in state_processing
StateRootMismatch,
}
impl From<ssz_types::Error> for BlockProcessingError {
fn from(error: ssz_types::Error) -> Self {
BlockProcessingError::SszTypesError(error)
}
}
impl Into<BlockProcessingError> for BlockInvalid {
@@ -116,8 +128,8 @@ pub enum AttestationValidationError {
/// Describes why an object is invalid.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum AttestationInvalid {
/// Attestation references a pre-genesis slot.
PreGenesis { genesis: Slot, attestation: Slot },
/// Shard exceeds SHARD_COUNT.
BadShard,
/// Attestation included before the inclusion delay.
IncludedTooEarly {
state: Slot,
@@ -128,27 +140,23 @@ pub enum AttestationInvalid {
IncludedTooLate { state: Slot, attestation: Slot },
/// Attestation target epoch does not match the current or previous epoch.
BadTargetEpoch,
/// Attestation justified epoch does not match the states current or previous justified epoch.
/// Attestation justified checkpoint doesn't match the state's current or previous justified
/// checkpoint.
///
/// `is_current` is `true` if the attestation was compared to the
/// `state.current_justified_epoch`, `false` if compared to `state.previous_justified_epoch`.
WrongJustifiedEpoch {
state: Epoch,
attestation: Epoch,
is_current: bool,
},
/// Attestation justified epoch root does not match root known to the state.
///
/// `is_current` is `true` if the attestation was compared to the
/// `state.current_justified_epoch`, `false` if compared to `state.previous_justified_epoch`.
WrongJustifiedRoot {
state: Hash256,
attestation: Hash256,
/// `state.current_justified_checkpoint`, `false` if compared to `state.previous_justified_checkpoint`.
WrongJustifiedCheckpoint {
state: Checkpoint,
attestation: Checkpoint,
is_current: bool,
},
/// Attestation crosslink root does not match the state crosslink root for the attestations
/// slot.
BadPreviousCrosslink,
BadParentCrosslinkHash,
/// Attestation crosslink start epoch does not match the end epoch of the state crosslink.
BadParentCrosslinkStartEpoch,
/// Attestation crosslink end epoch does not match the expected value.
BadParentCrosslinkEndEpoch,
/// The custody bitfield has some bits set `true`. This is not allowed in phase 0.
CustodyBitfieldHasSetBits,
/// There are no set bits on the attestation -- an attestation must be signed by at least one
@@ -164,6 +172,8 @@ pub enum AttestationInvalid {
committee_len: usize,
bitfield_len: usize,
},
/// The bits set in the custody bitfield are not a subset of those set in the aggregation bits.
CustodyBitfieldNotSubset,
/// There was no known committee in this `epoch` for the given shard and slot.
NoCommitteeForShard { shard: u64, slot: Slot },
/// The validator index was unknown.
@@ -186,6 +196,12 @@ impl From<IndexedAttestationValidationError> for AttestationValidationError {
}
}
impl From<ssz_types::Error> for AttestationValidationError {
fn from(error: ssz_types::Error) -> Self {
Self::from(IndexedAttestationValidationError::from(error))
}
}
/*
* `AttesterSlashing` Validation
*/
@@ -239,12 +255,14 @@ pub enum IndexedAttestationInvalid {
CustodyBitValidatorsIntersect,
/// The custody bitfield has some bits set `true`. This is not allowed in phase 0.
CustodyBitfieldHasSetBits,
/// The custody bitfield violated a type-level bound.
CustodyBitfieldBoundsError(ssz_types::Error),
/// No validator indices were specified.
NoValidatorIndices,
/// The number of indices exceeds the global maximum.
///
/// (max_indices, indices_given)
MaxIndicesExceed(u64, usize),
MaxIndicesExceed(usize, usize),
/// The validator indices were not in increasing order.
///
/// The error occurred between the given `index` and `index + 1`
@@ -263,6 +281,14 @@ impl Into<IndexedAttestationInvalid> for IndexedAttestationValidationError {
}
}
impl From<ssz_types::Error> for IndexedAttestationValidationError {
fn from(error: ssz_types::Error) -> Self {
IndexedAttestationValidationError::Invalid(
IndexedAttestationInvalid::CustodyBitfieldBoundsError(error),
)
}
}
impl_into_with_index_without_beacon_error!(
IndexedAttestationValidationError,
IndexedAttestationInvalid
@@ -356,7 +382,10 @@ pub enum ExitInvalid {
/// The exit is for a future epoch.
FutureEpoch { state: Epoch, exit: Epoch },
/// The validator has not been active for long enough.
TooYoungToLeave { lifespan: Epoch, expected: u64 },
TooYoungToExit {
current_epoch: Epoch,
earliest_exit_epoch: Epoch,
},
/// The exit signature was not signed by the validator.
BadSignature,
}

83
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/verify_indexed_attestation.rs → eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/is_valid_indexed_attestation.rs
View File

@@ -8,60 +8,58 @@ use types::*;
/// Verify an `IndexedAttestation`.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
pub fn verify_indexed_attestation<T: EthSpec>(
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn is_valid_indexed_attestation<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
indexed_attestation: &IndexedAttestation,
indexed_attestation: &IndexedAttestation<T>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
verify_indexed_attestation_parametric(state, indexed_attestation, spec, true)
is_valid_indexed_attestation_parametric(state, indexed_attestation, spec, true)
}
/// Verify but don't check the signature.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
pub fn verify_indexed_attestation_without_signature<T: EthSpec>(
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn is_valid_indexed_attestation_without_signature<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
indexed_attestation: &IndexedAttestation,
indexed_attestation: &IndexedAttestation<T>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
verify_indexed_attestation_parametric(state, indexed_attestation, spec, false)
is_valid_indexed_attestation_parametric(state, indexed_attestation, spec, false)
}
/// Optionally check the signature.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
fn verify_indexed_attestation_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
/// Spec v0.8.0
fn is_valid_indexed_attestation_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
indexed_attestation: &IndexedAttestation,
indexed_attestation: &IndexedAttestation<T>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
verify_signature: bool,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let custody_bit_0_indices = &indexed_attestation.custody_bit_0_indices;
let custody_bit_1_indices = &indexed_attestation.custody_bit_1_indices;
let bit_0_indices = &indexed_attestation.custody_bit_0_indices;
let bit_1_indices = &indexed_attestation.custody_bit_1_indices;
// Ensure no duplicate indices across custody bits
// Verify no index has custody bit equal to 1 [to be removed in phase 1]
verify!(bit_1_indices.is_empty(), Invalid::CustodyBitfieldHasSetBits);
// Verify max number of indices
let total_indices = bit_0_indices.len() + bit_1_indices.len();
verify!(
total_indices <= T::MaxValidatorsPerCommittee::to_usize(),
Invalid::MaxIndicesExceed(T::MaxValidatorsPerCommittee::to_usize(), total_indices)
);
// Verify index sets are disjoint
let custody_bit_intersection: HashSet<&u64> =
&HashSet::from_iter(custody_bit_0_indices) & &HashSet::from_iter(custody_bit_1_indices);
&HashSet::from_iter(bit_0_indices.iter()) & &HashSet::from_iter(bit_1_indices.iter());
verify!(
custody_bit_intersection.is_empty(),
Invalid::CustodyBitValidatorsIntersect
);
// Check that nobody signed with custody bit 1 (to be removed in phase 1)
if !custody_bit_1_indices.is_empty() {
invalid!(Invalid::CustodyBitfieldHasSetBits);
}
let total_indices = custody_bit_0_indices.len() + custody_bit_1_indices.len();
verify!(1 <= total_indices, Invalid::NoValidatorIndices);
verify!(
total_indices as u64 <= spec.max_indices_per_attestation,
Invalid::MaxIndicesExceed(spec.max_indices_per_attestation, total_indices)
);
// Check that both vectors of indices are sorted
let check_sorted = |list: &Vec<u64>| {
let check_sorted = |list: &[u64]| -> Result<(), Error> {
list.windows(2).enumerate().try_for_each(|(i, pair)| {
if pair[0] >= pair[1] {
invalid!(Invalid::BadValidatorIndicesOrdering(i));
@@ -71,11 +69,11 @@ fn verify_indexed_attestation_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
})?;
Ok(())
};
check_sorted(custody_bit_0_indices)?;
check_sorted(custody_bit_1_indices)?;
check_sorted(&bit_0_indices)?;
check_sorted(&bit_1_indices)?;
if verify_signature {
verify_indexed_attestation_signature(state, indexed_attestation, spec)?;
is_valid_indexed_attestation_signature(state, indexed_attestation, spec)?;
}
Ok(())
@@ -94,7 +92,7 @@ where
AggregatePublicKey::new(),
|mut aggregate_pubkey, &validator_idx| {
state
.validator_registry
.validators
.get(validator_idx as usize)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(Invalid::UnknownValidator(validator_idx)))
.map(|validator| {
@@ -107,10 +105,10 @@ where
/// Verify the signature of an IndexedAttestation.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
fn verify_indexed_attestation_signature<T: EthSpec>(
/// Spec v0.8.0
fn is_valid_indexed_attestation_signature<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
indexed_attestation: &IndexedAttestation,
indexed_attestation: &IndexedAttestation<T>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let bit_0_pubkey = create_aggregate_pubkey(state, &indexed_attestation.custody_bit_0_indices)?;
@@ -127,20 +125,11 @@ fn verify_indexed_attestation_signature<T: EthSpec>(
}
.tree_hash_root();
let mut messages = vec![];
let mut keys = vec![];
if !indexed_attestation.custody_bit_0_indices.is_empty() {
messages.push(&message_0[..]);
keys.push(&bit_0_pubkey);
}
if !indexed_attestation.custody_bit_1_indices.is_empty() {
messages.push(&message_1[..]);
keys.push(&bit_1_pubkey);
}
let messages = vec![&message_0[..], &message_1[..]];
let keys = vec![&bit_0_pubkey, &bit_1_pubkey];
let domain = spec.get_domain(
indexed_attestation.data.target_epoch,
indexed_attestation.data.target.epoch,
Domain::Attestation,
&state.fork,
);

2
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/tests.rs
View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ fn invalid_parent_block_root() {
Err(BlockProcessingError::Invalid(
BlockInvalid::ParentBlockRootMismatch {
state: Hash256::from_slice(&state.latest_block_header.signed_root()),
block: block.previous_block_root
block: block.parent_root
}
))
);

156
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/validate_attestation.rs
View File

@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
use super::errors::{AttestationInvalid as Invalid, AttestationValidationError as Error};
use crate::common::convert_to_indexed;
use crate::per_block_processing::{
verify_indexed_attestation, verify_indexed_attestation_without_signature,
};
use tree_hash::TreeHash;
use types::*;
/// Indicates if an `Attestation` is valid to be included in a block in the current epoch of the
/// given state.
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the `Attestation` is valid, otherwise indicates the reason for invalidity.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
pub fn validate_attestation<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attestation: &Attestation,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
validate_attestation_parametric(state, attestation, spec, true, false)
}
/// Like `validate_attestation` but doesn't run checks which may become true in future states.
pub fn validate_attestation_time_independent_only<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attestation: &Attestation,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
validate_attestation_parametric(state, attestation, spec, true, true)
}
/// Indicates if an `Attestation` is valid to be included in a block in the current epoch of the
/// given state, without validating the aggregate signature.
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the `Attestation` is valid, otherwise indicates the reason for invalidity.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
pub fn validate_attestation_without_signature<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attestation: &Attestation,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
validate_attestation_parametric(state, attestation, spec, false, false)
}
/// Indicates if an `Attestation` is valid to be included in a block in the current epoch of the
/// given state, optionally validating the aggregate signature.
///
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
fn validate_attestation_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attestation: &Attestation,
spec: &ChainSpec,
verify_signature: bool,
time_independent_only: bool,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let attestation_slot = state.get_attestation_slot(&attestation.data)?;
// Check attestation slot.
verify!(
time_independent_only
|| attestation_slot + spec.min_attestation_inclusion_delay <= state.slot,
Invalid::IncludedTooEarly {
state: state.slot,
delay: spec.min_attestation_inclusion_delay,
attestation: attestation_slot
}
);
verify!(
state.slot <= attestation_slot + T::slots_per_epoch(),
Invalid::IncludedTooLate {
state: state.slot,
attestation: attestation_slot
}
);
// Verify the Casper FFG vote.
if !time_independent_only {
verify_casper_ffg_vote(attestation, state)?;
}
// Crosslink data root is zero (to be removed in phase 1).
verify!(
attestation.data.crosslink_data_root == spec.zero_hash,
Invalid::ShardBlockRootNotZero
);
// Check signature and bitfields
let indexed_attestation = convert_to_indexed(state, attestation)?;
if verify_signature {
verify_indexed_attestation(state, &indexed_attestation, spec)?;
} else {
verify_indexed_attestation_without_signature(state, &indexed_attestation, spec)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Check target epoch, source epoch, source root, and source crosslink.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
fn verify_casper_ffg_vote<T: EthSpec>(
attestation: &Attestation,
state: &BeaconState<T>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let data = &attestation.data;
if data.target_epoch == state.current_epoch() {
verify!(
data.source_epoch == state.current_justified_epoch,
Invalid::WrongJustifiedEpoch {
state: state.current_justified_epoch,
attestation: data.source_epoch,
is_current: true,
}
);
verify!(
data.source_root == state.current_justified_root,
Invalid::WrongJustifiedRoot {
state: state.current_justified_root,
attestation: data.source_root,
is_current: true,
}
);
verify!(
data.previous_crosslink_root
== Hash256::from_slice(&state.get_current_crosslink(data.shard)?.tree_hash_root()),
Invalid::BadPreviousCrosslink
);
} else if data.target_epoch == state.previous_epoch() {
verify!(
data.source_epoch == state.previous_justified_epoch,
Invalid::WrongJustifiedEpoch {
state: state.previous_justified_epoch,
attestation: data.source_epoch,
is_current: false,
}
);
verify!(
data.source_root == state.previous_justified_root,
Invalid::WrongJustifiedRoot {
state: state.previous_justified_root,
attestation: data.source_root,
is_current: false,
}
);
verify!(
data.previous_crosslink_root
== Hash256::from_slice(&state.get_previous_crosslink(data.shard)?.tree_hash_root()),
Invalid::BadPreviousCrosslink
);
} else {
invalid!(Invalid::BadTargetEpoch)
}
Ok(())
}

156
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/verify_attestation.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
use super::errors::{AttestationInvalid as Invalid, AttestationValidationError as Error};
use crate::common::get_indexed_attestation;
use crate::per_block_processing::{
is_valid_indexed_attestation, is_valid_indexed_attestation_without_signature,
};
use tree_hash::TreeHash;
use types::*;
/// Indicates if an `Attestation` is valid to be included in a block in the current epoch of the
/// given state.
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the `Attestation` is valid, otherwise indicates the reason for invalidity.
///
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn verify_attestation<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attestation: &Attestation<T>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
verify_attestation_parametric(state, attestation, spec, true, false)
}
/// Like `verify_attestation` but doesn't run checks which may become true in future states.
pub fn verify_attestation_time_independent_only<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attestation: &Attestation<T>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
verify_attestation_parametric(state, attestation, spec, true, true)
}
/// Indicates if an `Attestation` is valid to be included in a block in the current epoch of the
/// given state, without validating the aggregate signature.
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the `Attestation` is valid, otherwise indicates the reason for invalidity.
///
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn verify_attestation_without_signature<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attestation: &Attestation<T>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
verify_attestation_parametric(state, attestation, spec, false, false)
}
/// Indicates if an `Attestation` is valid to be included in a block in the current epoch of the
/// given state, optionally validating the aggregate signature.
///
///
/// Spec v0.8.0
fn verify_attestation_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attestation: &Attestation<T>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
verify_signature: bool,
time_independent_only: bool,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let data = &attestation.data;
verify!(
data.crosslink.shard < T::ShardCount::to_u64(),
Invalid::BadShard
);
// Check attestation slot.
let attestation_slot = state.get_attestation_data_slot(&data)?;
verify!(
time_independent_only
|| attestation_slot + spec.min_attestation_inclusion_delay <= state.slot,
Invalid::IncludedTooEarly {
state: state.slot,
delay: spec.min_attestation_inclusion_delay,
attestation: attestation_slot
}
);
verify!(
state.slot <= attestation_slot + T::slots_per_epoch(),
Invalid::IncludedTooLate {
state: state.slot,
attestation: attestation_slot
}
);
// Verify the Casper FFG vote and crosslink data.
if !time_independent_only {
let parent_crosslink = verify_casper_ffg_vote(attestation, state)?;
verify!(
data.crosslink.parent_root == Hash256::from_slice(&parent_crosslink.tree_hash_root()),
Invalid::BadParentCrosslinkHash
);
verify!(
data.crosslink.start_epoch == parent_crosslink.end_epoch,
Invalid::BadParentCrosslinkStartEpoch
);
verify!(
data.crosslink.end_epoch
== std::cmp::min(
data.target.epoch,
parent_crosslink.end_epoch + spec.max_epochs_per_crosslink
),
Invalid::BadParentCrosslinkEndEpoch
);
}
// Crosslink data root is zero (to be removed in phase 1).
verify!(
attestation.data.crosslink.data_root == Hash256::zero(),
Invalid::ShardBlockRootNotZero
);
// Check signature and bitfields
let indexed_attestation = get_indexed_attestation(state, attestation)?;
if verify_signature {
is_valid_indexed_attestation(state, &indexed_attestation, spec)?;
} else {
is_valid_indexed_attestation_without_signature(state, &indexed_attestation, spec)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Check target epoch and source checkpoint.
///
/// Return the parent crosslink for further checks.
///
/// Spec v0.8.0
fn verify_casper_ffg_vote<'a, T: EthSpec>(
attestation: &Attestation<T>,
state: &'a BeaconState<T>,
) -> Result<&'a Crosslink, Error> {
let data = &attestation.data;
if data.target.epoch == state.current_epoch() {
verify!(
data.source == state.current_justified_checkpoint,
Invalid::WrongJustifiedCheckpoint {
state: state.current_justified_checkpoint.clone(),
attestation: data.source.clone(),
is_current: true,
}
);
Ok(state.get_current_crosslink(data.crosslink.shard)?)
} else if data.target.epoch == state.previous_epoch() {
verify!(
data.source == state.previous_justified_checkpoint,
Invalid::WrongJustifiedCheckpoint {
state: state.previous_justified_checkpoint.clone(),
attestation: data.source.clone(),
is_current: false,
}
);
Ok(state.get_previous_crosslink(data.crosslink.shard)?)
} else {
invalid!(Invalid::BadTargetEpoch)
}
}

18
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/verify_attester_slashing.rs
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
use super::errors::{AttesterSlashingInvalid as Invalid, AttesterSlashingValidationError as Error};
use super::verify_indexed_attestation::verify_indexed_attestation;
use super::is_valid_indexed_attestation::is_valid_indexed_attestation;
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use types::*;
@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ use types::*;
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the `AttesterSlashing` is valid, otherwise indicates the reason for invalidity.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.1
pub fn verify_attester_slashing<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attester_slashing: &AttesterSlashing,
attester_slashing: &AttesterSlashing<T>,
should_verify_indexed_attestations: bool,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ pub fn verify_attester_slashing<T: EthSpec>(
);
if should_verify_indexed_attestations {
verify_indexed_attestation(state, &attestation_1, spec)
is_valid_indexed_attestation(state, &attestation_1, spec)
.map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(Invalid::IndexedAttestation1Invalid(e.into())))?;
verify_indexed_attestation(state, &attestation_2, spec)
is_valid_indexed_attestation(state, &attestation_2, spec)
.map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(Invalid::IndexedAttestation2Invalid(e.into())))?;
}
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ pub fn verify_attester_slashing<T: EthSpec>(
///
/// Returns Ok(indices) if `indices.len() > 0`.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.1
pub fn get_slashable_indices<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attester_slashing: &AttesterSlashing,
attester_slashing: &AttesterSlashing<T>,
) -> Result<Vec<u64>, Error> {
get_slashable_indices_modular(state, attester_slashing, |_, validator| {
validator.is_slashable_at(state.current_epoch())
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ pub fn get_slashable_indices<T: EthSpec>(
/// for determining whether a given validator should be considered slashable.
pub fn get_slashable_indices_modular<F, T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
attester_slashing: &AttesterSlashing,
attester_slashing: &AttesterSlashing<T>,
is_slashable: F,
) -> Result<Vec<u64>, Error>
where
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ where
for index in &attesting_indices_1 & &attesting_indices_2 {
let validator = state
.validator_registry
.validators
.get(index as usize)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(Invalid::UnknownValidator(index)))?;

46
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/verify_deposit.rs
View File

@@ -5,43 +5,27 @@ use types::*;
/// Verify `Deposit.pubkey` signed `Deposit.signature`.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn verify_deposit_signature<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
deposit: &Deposit,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
// Note: Deposits are valid across forks, thus the deposit domain is computed
// with the fork zeroed.
let domain = spec.get_domain(state.current_epoch(), Domain::Deposit, &Fork::default());
verify!(
deposit.data.signature.verify(
&deposit.data.signed_root(),
spec.get_domain(state.current_epoch(), Domain::Deposit, &state.fork),
&deposit.data.pubkey,
),
deposit
.data
.signature
.verify(&deposit.data.signed_root(), domain, &deposit.data.pubkey,),
Invalid::BadSignature
);
Ok(())
}
/// Verify that the `Deposit` index is correct.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
pub fn verify_deposit_index<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
deposit: &Deposit,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
verify!(
deposit.index == state.deposit_index,
Invalid::BadIndex {
state: state.deposit_index,
deposit: deposit.index
}
);
Ok(())
}
/// Returns a `Some(validator index)` if a pubkey already exists in the `validator_registry`,
/// Returns a `Some(validator index)` if a pubkey already exists in the `validators`,
/// otherwise returns `None`.
///
/// ## Errors
@@ -57,10 +41,14 @@ pub fn get_existing_validator_index<T: EthSpec>(
/// Verify that a deposit is included in the state's eth1 deposit root.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// The deposit index is provided as a parameter so we can check proofs
/// before they're due to be processed, and in parallel.
///
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn verify_deposit_merkle_proof<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
deposit: &Deposit,
deposit_index: u64,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let leaf = deposit.data.tree_hash_root();
@@ -69,9 +57,9 @@ pub fn verify_deposit_merkle_proof<T: EthSpec>(
verify_merkle_proof(
Hash256::from_slice(&leaf),
&deposit.proof[..],
spec.deposit_contract_tree_depth as usize,
deposit.index as usize,
state.latest_eth1_data.deposit_root,
spec.deposit_contract_tree_depth as usize + 1,
deposit_index as usize,
state.eth1_data.deposit_root,
),
Invalid::BadMerkleProof
);

17
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/verify_exit.rs
View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ use types::*;
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the `Exit` is valid, otherwise indicates the reason for invalidity.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn verify_exit<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
exit: &VoluntaryExit,
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ pub fn verify_exit<T: EthSpec>(
/// Like `verify_exit` but doesn't run checks which may become true in future states.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn verify_exit_time_independent_only<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
exit: &VoluntaryExit,
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ pub fn verify_exit_time_independent_only<T: EthSpec>(
/// Parametric version of `verify_exit` that skips some checks if `time_independent_only` is true.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
fn verify_exit_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
exit: &VoluntaryExit,
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ fn verify_exit_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
time_independent_only: bool,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let validator = state
.validator_registry
.validators
.get(exit.validator_index as usize)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(Invalid::ValidatorUnknown(exit.validator_index)))?;
@@ -63,12 +63,11 @@ fn verify_exit_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
);
// Verify the validator has been active long enough.
let lifespan = state.current_epoch() - validator.activation_epoch;
verify!(
lifespan >= spec.persistent_committee_period,
Invalid::TooYoungToLeave {
lifespan,
expected: spec.persistent_committee_period,
state.current_epoch() >= validator.activation_epoch + spec.persistent_committee_period,
Invalid::TooYoungToExit {
current_epoch: state.current_epoch(),
earliest_exit_epoch: validator.activation_epoch + spec.persistent_committee_period,
}
);

9
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/verify_proposer_slashing.rs
View File

@@ -7,19 +7,20 @@ use types::*;
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the `ProposerSlashing` is valid, otherwise indicates the reason for invalidity.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn verify_proposer_slashing<T: EthSpec>(
proposer_slashing: &ProposerSlashing,
state: &BeaconState<T>,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let proposer = state
.validator_registry
.validators
.get(proposer_slashing.proposer_index as usize)
.ok_or_else(|| {
Error::Invalid(Invalid::ProposerUnknown(proposer_slashing.proposer_index))
})?;
// Verify that the epoch is the same
verify!(
proposer_slashing.header_1.slot.epoch(T::slots_per_epoch())
== proposer_slashing.header_2.slot.epoch(T::slots_per_epoch()),
@@ -29,11 +30,13 @@ pub fn verify_proposer_slashing<T: EthSpec>(
)
);
// But the headers are different
verify!(
proposer_slashing.header_1 != proposer_slashing.header_2,
Invalid::ProposalsIdentical
);
// Check proposer is slashable
verify!(
proposer.is_slashable_at(state.current_epoch()),
Invalid::ProposerNotSlashable(proposer_slashing.proposer_index)
@@ -65,7 +68,7 @@ pub fn verify_proposer_slashing<T: EthSpec>(
///
/// Returns `true` if the signature is valid.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
fn verify_header_signature<T: EthSpec>(
header: &BeaconBlockHeader,
pubkey: &PublicKey,

16
eth2/state_processing/src/per_block_processing/verify_transfer.rs
View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use types::*;
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the `Transfer` is valid, otherwise indicates the reason for invalidity.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn verify_transfer<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
transfer: &Transfer,
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ pub fn verify_transfer<T: EthSpec>(
/// Like `verify_transfer` but doesn't run checks which may become true in future states.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn verify_transfer_time_independent_only<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
transfer: &Transfer,
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ pub fn verify_transfer_time_independent_only<T: EthSpec>(
/// present or future.
/// - Validator transfer eligibility (e.g., is withdrawable)
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
fn verify_transfer_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
state: &BeaconState<T>,
transfer: &Transfer,
@@ -97,22 +97,20 @@ fn verify_transfer_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
// Load the sender `Validator` record from the state.
let sender_validator = state
.validator_registry
.validators
.get(transfer.sender as usize)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid(Invalid::FromValidatorUnknown(transfer.sender)))?;
let epoch = state.slot.epoch(T::slots_per_epoch());
// Ensure one of the following is met:
//
// - Time dependent checks are being ignored.
// - The sender has not been activated.
// - The sender has never been eligible for activation.
// - The sender is withdrawable at the state's epoch.
// - The transfer will not reduce the sender below the max effective balance.
verify!(
time_independent_only
|| sender_validator.activation_eligibility_epoch == spec.far_future_epoch
|| sender_validator.is_withdrawable_at(epoch)
|| sender_validator.is_withdrawable_at(state.current_epoch())
|| total_amount + spec.max_effective_balance <= sender_balance,
Invalid::FromValidatorIneligibleForTransfer(transfer.sender)
);
@@ -154,7 +152,7 @@ fn verify_transfer_parametric<T: EthSpec>(
///
/// Does not check that the transfer is valid, however checks for overflow in all actions.
///
/// Spec v0.6.3
/// Spec v0.8.0
pub fn execute_transfer<T: EthSpec>(
state: &mut BeaconState<T>,
transfer: &Transfer,