should_extend_payload fix

beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/inclusion_list_verification.rs

@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> GossipVerifiedInclusionList<T> {
             return Err(GossipInclusionListError::InvalidSignature);
         }
 
+        // TODO(focil): Per spec p2p-interface.md rule 5, the first OR second valid message
+        // should be allowed (to enable equivocation detection in the cache). Currently this
+        // rejects any second message, making the cache's equivocation logic dead code.
+        // See: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/master/specs/heze/p2p-interface.md#inclusion_list
         if chain.inclusion_list_seen(signed_il) {
             return Err(GossipInclusionListError::PriorInclusionListKnown);
         }

consensus/proto_array/src/proto_array.rs

@@ -1510,9 +1510,14 @@ impl ProtoArray {
         proto_node: &ProtoNode,
         proposer_boost_root: Hash256,
     ) -> Result<bool, Error> {
-        // If the block's inclusion list satisfaction has been recorded as false,
-        // do not extend the payload.
-        if self.payload_inclusion_list_satisfaction.get(&fc_node.root) == Some(&false) {
+        // Per spec: is_payload_inclusion_list_satisfied returns false unless the
+        // root is in the map AND the value is true.
+        if !self
+            .payload_inclusion_list_satisfaction
+            .get(&fc_node.root)
+            .copied()
+            .unwrap_or(false)
+        {
             return Ok(false);
         }