This PR address the following spec change: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/3312
Instead of subscribing to a long-lived subnet for every attached validator to a beacon node, all beacon nodes will subscribe to `SUBNETS_PER_NODE` long-lived subnets. This is currently set to 2 for mainnet.
This PR does not include any scoring or advanced discovery mechanisms. A future PR will improve discovery and we can implement scoring after the next hard fork when we expect all client teams and all implementations to respect this spec change.
This will be a significant change in the subnet network structure for consensus clients and we will likely have to monitor and tweak our peer management logic.
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Adds metrics to track validators that are submitting equivocating (but not slashable) sync messages. This follows on from some research we've been doing in a separate fork of LH.
## Additional Info
@jimmygchen and @michaelsproul have already run their eyes over this so it should be easy to get into v4.2.0, IMO.
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Adds an additional check to a feature introduced in #4179 to prevent us from re-queuing already-known blocks that could be rejected immediately.
## Additional Info
Ideally this would have been included in v4.1.0, however we came across it too late to release it safely. We decided that the safest path forward is to release *without* this check and then patch it in the next version. The lack of this check should only result in a very minor performance impact (the impact is totally negligible in my assessment).
## Issue Addressed
NA
## Proposed Changes
Adds a flag to store invalid blocks on disk for teh debugz. Only *some* invalid blocks are stored, those which:
- Were received via gossip (rather than RPC, for instance)
- This keeps things simple to start with and should capture most blocks.
- Passed gossip verification
- This reduces the ability for random people to fill up our disk. A proposer signature is required to write something to disk.
## Additional Info
It's possible that we'll store blocks that aren't necessarily invalid, but we had an internal error during verification. Those blocks seem like they might be useful sometimes.
This commit adds a check to the networking service when handling core gossipsub topic subscription requests. If the BN is already subscribed to the core topics, we won't attempt to resubscribe.
## Issue Addressed
#4258
## Proposed Changes
- In the networking service, check if we're already subscribed to all of the core gossipsub topics and, if so, do nothing
## Additional Info
N/A
## Limit Backfill Sync
This PR transitions Lighthouse from syncing all the way back to genesis to only syncing back to the weak subjectivity point (~ 5 months) when syncing via a checkpoint sync.
There are a number of important points to note with this PR:
- Firstly and most importantly, this PR fundamentally shifts the default security guarantees of checkpoint syncing in Lighthouse. Prior to this PR, Lighthouse could verify the checkpoint of any given chain by ensuring the chain eventually terminates at the corresponding genesis. This guarantee can still be employed via the new CLI flag --genesis-backfill which will prompt lighthouse to the old behaviour of downloading all blocks back to genesis. The new behaviour only checks the proposer signatures for the last 5 months of blocks but cannot guarantee the chain matches the genesis chain.
- I have not modified any of the peer scoring or RPC responses. Clients syncing from gensis, will downscore new Lighthouse peers that do not possess blocks prior to the WSP. This is by design, as Lighthouse nodes of this form, need a mechanism to sort through peers in order to find useful peers in order to complete their genesis sync. We therefore do not discriminate between empty/error responses for blocks prior or post the local WSP. If we request a block that a peer does not posses, then fundamentally that peer is less useful to us than other peers.
- This will make a radical shift in that the majority of nodes will no longer store the full history of the chain. In the future we could add a pruning mechanism to remove old blocks from the db also.
Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
## Issue Addressed
#4150
## Proposed Changes
Maintain trusted peers in the pruning logic. ~~In principle the changes here are not necessary as a trusted peer has a max score (100) and all other peers can have at most 0 (because we don't implement positive scores). This means that we should never prune trusted peers unless we have more trusted peers than the target peer count.~~
This change shifts this logic to explicitly never prune trusted peers which I expect is the intuitive behaviour.
~~I suspect the issue in #4150 arises when a trusted peer disconnects from us for one reason or another and then we remove that peer from our peerdb as it becomes stale. When it re-connects at some large time later, it is no longer a trusted peer.~~
Currently we do disconnect trusted peers, and this PR corrects this to maintain trusted peers in the pruning logic.
As suggested in #4150 we maintain trusted peers in the db and thus we remember them even if they disconnect from us.
* Update Engine API to Latest
* Get Mock EE Working
* Fix Mock EE
* Update Engine API Again
* Rip out get_blobs_bundle Stuff
* Fix Test Harness
* Fix Clippy Complaints
* Fix Beacon Chain Tests
