Files
lighthouse/beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/block_verification.rs
realbigsean 255cc25623 Weak subjectivity start from genesis (#1675)
This commit was edited by Paul H when rebasing from master to
v0.3.0-staging.

Solution 2 proposed here: https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/1435#issuecomment-692317639

- Adds an optional `--wss-checkpoint` flag that takes a string `root:epoch`
- Verify that the given checkpoint exists in the chain, or that the the chain syncs through this checkpoint. If not, shutdown and prompt the user to purge state before restarting.

Co-authored-by: Paul Hauner <paul@paulhauner.com>
2020-10-03 10:00:28 +10:00

1189 lines
43 KiB
Rust

//! Provides `SignedBeaconBlock` verification logic.
//!
//! Specifically, it provides the following:
//!
//! - Verification for gossip blocks (i.e., should we gossip some block from the network).
//! - Verification for normal blocks (e.g., some block received on the RPC during a parent lookup).
//! - Verification for chain segments (e.g., some chain of blocks received on the RPC during a
//! sync).
//!
//! The primary source of complexity here is that we wish to avoid doing duplicate work as a block
//! moves through the verification process. For example, if some block is verified for gossip, we
//! do not wish to re-verify the block proposal signature or re-hash the block. Or, if we've
//! verified the signatures of a block during a chain segment import, we do not wish to verify each
//! signature individually again.
//!
//! The incremental processing steps (e.g., signatures verified but not the state transition) is
//! represented as a sequence of wrapper-types around the block. There is a linear progression of
//! types, starting at a `SignedBeaconBlock` and finishing with a `Fully VerifiedBlock` (see
//! diagram below).
//!
//! ```ignore
//! START
//! |
//! ▼
//! SignedBeaconBlock
//! |---------------
//! | |
//! | ▼
//! | GossipVerifiedBlock
//! | |
//! |---------------
//! |
//! ▼
//! SignatureVerifiedBlock
//! |
//! ▼
//! FullyVerifiedBlock
//! |
//! ▼
//! END
//!
//! ```
use crate::validator_pubkey_cache::ValidatorPubkeyCache;
use crate::{
beacon_chain::{
BLOCK_PROCESSING_CACHE_LOCK_TIMEOUT, MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY,
VALIDATOR_PUBKEY_CACHE_LOCK_TIMEOUT,
},
metrics, BeaconChain, BeaconChainError, BeaconChainTypes, BeaconSnapshot,
};
use fork_choice::{ForkChoice, ForkChoiceStore};
use parking_lot::RwLockReadGuard;
use slog::{error, Logger};
use slot_clock::SlotClock;
use ssz::Encode;
use state_processing::{
block_signature_verifier::{BlockSignatureVerifier, Error as BlockSignatureVerifierError},
per_block_processing,
per_epoch_processing::EpochProcessingSummary,
per_slot_processing, BlockProcessingError, BlockSignatureStrategy, SlotProcessingError,
};
use std::borrow::Cow;
use std::convert::TryFrom;
use std::fs;
use std::io::Write;
use store::{Error as DBError, HotColdDB, HotStateSummary, StoreOp};
use tree_hash::TreeHash;
use types::{
BeaconBlock, BeaconState, BeaconStateError, ChainSpec, CloneConfig, EthSpec, Hash256,
PublicKey, RelativeEpoch, SignedBeaconBlock, Slot,
};
/// Maximum block slot number. Block with slots bigger than this constant will NOT be processed.
const MAXIMUM_BLOCK_SLOT_NUMBER: u64 = 4_294_967_296; // 2^32
/// If true, everytime a block is processed the pre-state, post-state and block are written to SSZ
/// files in the temp directory.
///
/// Only useful for testing.
const WRITE_BLOCK_PROCESSING_SSZ: bool = cfg!(feature = "write_ssz_files");
/// Returned when a block was not verified. A block is not verified for two reasons:
///
/// - The block is malformed/invalid (indicated by all results other than `BeaconChainError`.
/// - We encountered an error whilst trying to verify the block (a `BeaconChainError`).
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum BlockError<T: EthSpec> {
/// The parent block was unknown.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// It's unclear if this block is valid, but it cannot be processed without already knowing
/// its parent.
ParentUnknown(Box<SignedBeaconBlock<T>>),
/// The block skips too many slots and is a DoS risk.
TooManySkippedSlots { parent_slot: Slot, block_slot: Slot },
/// The block slot is greater than the present slot.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// Assuming the local clock is correct, the peer has sent an invalid message.
FutureSlot {
present_slot: Slot,
block_slot: Slot,
},
/// The block state_root does not match the generated state.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The peer has incompatible state transition logic and is faulty.
StateRootMismatch { block: Hash256, local: Hash256 },
/// The block was a genesis block, these blocks cannot be re-imported.
GenesisBlock,
/// The slot is finalized, no need to import.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// It's unclear if this block is valid, but this block is for a finalized slot and is
/// therefore useless to us.
WouldRevertFinalizedSlot {
block_slot: Slot,
finalized_slot: Slot,
},
/// The block conflicts with finalization, no need to propagate.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// It's unclear if this block is valid, but it conflicts with finality and shouldn't be
/// imported.
NotFinalizedDescendant { block_parent_root: Hash256 },
/// Block is already known, no need to re-import.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The block is valid and we have already imported a block with this hash.
BlockIsAlreadyKnown,
/// A block for this proposer and slot has already been observed.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The `proposer` has already proposed a block at this slot. The existing block may or may not
/// be equal to the given block.
RepeatProposal { proposer: u64, slot: Slot },
/// The block slot exceeds the MAXIMUM_BLOCK_SLOT_NUMBER.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// We set a very, very high maximum slot number and this block exceeds it. There's no good
/// reason to be sending these blocks, they're from future slots.
///
/// The block is invalid and the peer is faulty.
BlockSlotLimitReached,
/// The `BeaconBlock` has a `proposer_index` that does not match the index we computed locally.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The block is invalid and the peer is faulty.
IncorrectBlockProposer { block: u64, local_shuffling: u64 },
/// The proposal signature in invalid.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The block is invalid and the peer is faulty.
ProposalSignatureInvalid,
/// The `block.proposal_index` is not known.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The block is invalid and the peer is faulty.
UnknownValidator(u64),
/// A signature in the block is invalid (exactly which is unknown).
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The block is invalid and the peer is faulty.
InvalidSignature,
/// The provided block is from an later slot than its parent.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The block is invalid and the peer is faulty.
BlockIsNotLaterThanParent { block_slot: Slot, state_slot: Slot },
/// At least one block in the chain segment did not have it's parent root set to the root of
/// the prior block.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The chain of blocks is invalid and the peer is faulty.
NonLinearParentRoots,
/// The slots of the blocks in the chain segment were not strictly increasing. I.e., a child
/// had lower slot than a parent.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The chain of blocks is invalid and the peer is faulty.
NonLinearSlots,
/// The block failed the specification's `per_block_processing` function, it is invalid.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The block is invalid and the peer is faulty.
PerBlockProcessingError(BlockProcessingError),
/// There was an error whilst processing the block. It is not necessarily invalid.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// We were unable to process this block due to an internal error. It's unclear if the block is
/// valid.
BeaconChainError(BeaconChainError),
/// There was an error whilst verifying weak subjectivity. This block conflicts with the
/// configured weak subjectivity checkpoint and was not imported.
///
/// ## Peer scoring
///
/// The block is invalid and the peer is faulty.
WeakSubjectivityConflict,
}
impl<T: EthSpec> std::fmt::Display for BlockError<T> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
BlockError::ParentUnknown(block) => {
write!(f, "ParentUnknown(parent_root:{})", block.parent_root())
}
other => write!(f, "{:?}", other),
}
}
}
impl<T: EthSpec> From<BlockSignatureVerifierError> for BlockError<T> {
fn from(e: BlockSignatureVerifierError) -> Self {
match e {
// Make a special distinction for `IncorrectBlockProposer` since it indicates an
// invalid block, not an internal error.
BlockSignatureVerifierError::IncorrectBlockProposer {
block,
local_shuffling,
} => BlockError::IncorrectBlockProposer {
block,
local_shuffling,
},
e => BlockError::BeaconChainError(BeaconChainError::BlockSignatureVerifierError(e)),
}
}
}
impl<T: EthSpec> From<BeaconChainError> for BlockError<T> {
fn from(e: BeaconChainError) -> Self {
BlockError::BeaconChainError(e)
}
}
impl<T: EthSpec> From<BeaconStateError> for BlockError<T> {
fn from(e: BeaconStateError) -> Self {
BlockError::BeaconChainError(BeaconChainError::BeaconStateError(e))
}
}
impl<T: EthSpec> From<SlotProcessingError> for BlockError<T> {
fn from(e: SlotProcessingError) -> Self {
BlockError::BeaconChainError(BeaconChainError::SlotProcessingError(e))
}
}
impl<T: EthSpec> From<DBError> for BlockError<T> {
fn from(e: DBError) -> Self {
BlockError::BeaconChainError(BeaconChainError::DBError(e))
}
}
/// Verify all signatures (except deposit signatures) on all blocks in the `chain_segment`. If all
/// signatures are valid, the `chain_segment` is mapped to a `Vec<SignatureVerifiedBlock>` that can
/// later be transformed into a `FullyVerifiedBlock` without re-checking the signatures. If any
/// signature in the block is invalid, an `Err` is returned (it is not possible to known _which_
/// signature was invalid).
///
/// ## Errors
///
/// The given `chain_segment` must span no more than two epochs, otherwise an error will be
/// returned.
pub fn signature_verify_chain_segment<T: BeaconChainTypes>(
mut chain_segment: Vec<(Hash256, SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>)>,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<Vec<SignatureVerifiedBlock<T>>, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
if chain_segment.is_empty() {
return Ok(vec![]);
}
let (first_root, first_block) = chain_segment.remove(0);
let (mut parent, first_block) = load_parent(first_block, chain)?;
let slot = first_block.slot();
chain_segment.insert(0, (first_root, first_block));
let highest_slot = chain_segment
.last()
.map(|(_, block)| block.slot())
.unwrap_or_else(|| slot);
let state = cheap_state_advance_to_obtain_committees(
&mut parent.beacon_state,
highest_slot,
&chain.spec,
)?;
let pubkey_cache = get_validator_pubkey_cache(chain)?;
let mut signature_verifier = get_signature_verifier(&state, &pubkey_cache, &chain.spec);
for (block_root, block) in &chain_segment {
signature_verifier.include_all_signatures(block, Some(*block_root))?;
}
if signature_verifier.verify().is_err() {
return Err(BlockError::InvalidSignature);
}
drop(pubkey_cache);
let mut signature_verified_blocks = chain_segment
.into_iter()
.map(|(block_root, block)| SignatureVerifiedBlock {
block,
block_root,
parent: None,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if let Some(signature_verified_block) = signature_verified_blocks.first_mut() {
signature_verified_block.parent = Some(parent);
}
Ok(signature_verified_blocks)
}
/// A wrapper around a `SignedBeaconBlock` that indicates it has been approved for re-gossiping on
/// the p2p network.
pub struct GossipVerifiedBlock<T: BeaconChainTypes> {
pub block: SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
pub block_root: Hash256,
parent: BeaconSnapshot<T::EthSpec>,
}
/// A wrapper around a `SignedBeaconBlock` that indicates that all signatures (except the deposit
/// signatures) have been verified.
pub struct SignatureVerifiedBlock<T: BeaconChainTypes> {
block: SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
block_root: Hash256,
parent: Option<BeaconSnapshot<T::EthSpec>>,
}
/// A wrapper around a `SignedBeaconBlock` that indicates that this block is fully verified and
/// ready to import into the `BeaconChain`. The validation includes:
///
/// - Parent is known
/// - Signatures
/// - State root check
/// - Per block processing
///
/// Note: a `FullyVerifiedBlock` is not _forever_ valid to be imported, it may later become invalid
/// due to finality or some other event. A `FullyVerifiedBlock` should be imported into the
/// `BeaconChain` immediately after it is instantiated.
pub struct FullyVerifiedBlock<'a, T: BeaconChainTypes> {
pub block: SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
pub block_root: Hash256,
pub state: BeaconState<T::EthSpec>,
pub parent_block: SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
pub intermediate_states: Vec<StoreOp<'a, T::EthSpec>>,
}
/// Implemented on types that can be converted into a `FullyVerifiedBlock`.
///
/// Used to allow functions to accept blocks at various stages of verification.
pub trait IntoFullyVerifiedBlock<T: BeaconChainTypes> {
fn into_fully_verified_block(
self,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<FullyVerifiedBlock<T>, BlockError<T::EthSpec>>;
fn block(&self) -> &SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>;
}
impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> GossipVerifiedBlock<T> {
/// Instantiates `Self`, a wrapper that indicates the given `block` is safe to be re-gossiped
/// on the p2p network.
///
/// Returns an error if the block is invalid, or if the block was unable to be verified.
pub fn new(
block: SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<Self, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
// Do not gossip or process blocks from future slots.
let present_slot_with_tolerance = chain
.slot_clock
.now_with_future_tolerance(MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY)
.ok_or_else(|| BeaconChainError::UnableToReadSlot)?;
if block.slot() > present_slot_with_tolerance {
return Err(BlockError::FutureSlot {
present_slot: present_slot_with_tolerance,
block_slot: block.slot(),
});
}
let block_root = get_block_root(&block);
// Do not gossip a block from a finalized slot.
check_block_against_finalized_slot(&block.message, chain)?;
// Check if the block is already known. We know it is post-finalization, so it is
// sufficient to check the fork choice.
//
// In normal operation this isn't necessary, however it is useful immediately after a
// reboot if the `observed_block_producers` cache is empty. In that case, without this
// check, we will load the parent and state from disk only to find out later that we
// already know this block.
if chain.fork_choice.read().contains_block(&block_root) {
return Err(BlockError::BlockIsAlreadyKnown);
}
// Check that we have not already received a block with a valid signature for this slot.
if chain
.observed_block_producers
.proposer_has_been_observed(&block.message)
.map_err(|e| BlockError::BeaconChainError(e.into()))?
{
return Err(BlockError::RepeatProposal {
proposer: block.message.proposer_index,
slot: block.message.slot,
});
}
// Do not process a block that doesn't descend from the finalized root.
//
// We check this *before* we load the parent so that we can return a more detailed error.
let block = check_block_is_finalized_descendant::<T, _>(
block,
&chain.fork_choice.read(),
&chain.store,
)?;
let (mut parent, block) = load_parent(block, chain)?;
// Reject any block that exceeds our limit on skipped slots.
check_block_skip_slots(chain, &parent.beacon_block.message, &block.message)?;
let state = cheap_state_advance_to_obtain_committees(
&mut parent.beacon_state,
block.slot(),
&chain.spec,
)?;
let signature_is_valid = {
let pubkey_cache = get_validator_pubkey_cache(chain)?;
let pubkey = pubkey_cache
.get(block.message.proposer_index as usize)
.ok_or_else(|| BlockError::UnknownValidator(block.message.proposer_index))?;
block.verify_signature(
Some(block_root),
pubkey,
&state.fork,
chain.genesis_validators_root,
&chain.spec,
)
};
if !signature_is_valid {
return Err(BlockError::ProposalSignatureInvalid);
}
// Now the signature is valid, store the proposal so we don't accept another from this
// validator and slot.
//
// It's important to double-check that the proposer still hasn't been observed so we don't
// have a race-condition when verifying two blocks simultaneously.
if chain
.observed_block_producers
.observe_proposer(&block.message)
.map_err(|e| BlockError::BeaconChainError(e.into()))?
{
return Err(BlockError::RepeatProposal {
proposer: block.message.proposer_index,
slot: block.message.slot,
});
}
let expected_proposer =
state.get_beacon_proposer_index(block.message.slot, &chain.spec)? as u64;
if block.message.proposer_index != expected_proposer {
return Err(BlockError::IncorrectBlockProposer {
block: block.message.proposer_index,
local_shuffling: expected_proposer,
});
}
Ok(Self {
block,
block_root,
parent,
})
}
pub fn block_root(&self) -> Hash256 {
self.block_root
}
}
impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> IntoFullyVerifiedBlock<T> for GossipVerifiedBlock<T> {
/// Completes verification of the wrapped `block`.
fn into_fully_verified_block(
self,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<FullyVerifiedBlock<T>, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
let fully_verified = SignatureVerifiedBlock::from_gossip_verified_block(self, chain)?;
fully_verified.into_fully_verified_block(chain)
}
fn block(&self) -> &SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec> {
&self.block
}
}
impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> SignatureVerifiedBlock<T> {
/// Instantiates `Self`, a wrapper that indicates that all signatures (except the deposit
/// signatures) are valid (i.e., signed by the correct public keys).
///
/// Returns an error if the block is invalid, or if the block was unable to be verified.
pub fn new(
block: SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<Self, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
let (mut parent, block) = load_parent(block, chain)?;
// Reject any block that exceeds our limit on skipped slots.
check_block_skip_slots(chain, &parent.beacon_block.message, &block.message)?;
let block_root = get_block_root(&block);
let state = cheap_state_advance_to_obtain_committees(
&mut parent.beacon_state,
block.slot(),
&chain.spec,
)?;
let pubkey_cache = get_validator_pubkey_cache(chain)?;
let mut signature_verifier = get_signature_verifier(&state, &pubkey_cache, &chain.spec);
signature_verifier.include_all_signatures(&block, Some(block_root))?;
if signature_verifier.verify().is_ok() {
Ok(Self {
block,
block_root,
parent: Some(parent),
})
} else {
Err(BlockError::InvalidSignature)
}
}
/// Finishes signature verification on the provided `GossipVerifedBlock`. Does not re-verify
/// the proposer signature.
pub fn from_gossip_verified_block(
from: GossipVerifiedBlock<T>,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<Self, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
let mut parent = from.parent;
let block = from.block;
let state = cheap_state_advance_to_obtain_committees(
&mut parent.beacon_state,
block.slot(),
&chain.spec,
)?;
let pubkey_cache = get_validator_pubkey_cache(chain)?;
let mut signature_verifier = get_signature_verifier(&state, &pubkey_cache, &chain.spec);
signature_verifier.include_all_signatures_except_proposal(&block)?;
if signature_verifier.verify().is_ok() {
Ok(Self {
block,
block_root: from.block_root,
parent: Some(parent),
})
} else {
Err(BlockError::InvalidSignature)
}
}
}
impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> IntoFullyVerifiedBlock<T> for SignatureVerifiedBlock<T> {
/// Completes verification of the wrapped `block`.
fn into_fully_verified_block(
self,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<FullyVerifiedBlock<T>, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
let (parent, block) = if let Some(parent) = self.parent {
(parent, self.block)
} else {
load_parent(self.block, chain)?
};
FullyVerifiedBlock::from_signature_verified_components(
block,
self.block_root,
parent,
chain,
)
}
fn block(&self) -> &SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec> {
&self.block
}
}
impl<T: BeaconChainTypes> IntoFullyVerifiedBlock<T> for SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec> {
/// Verifies the `SignedBeaconBlock` by first transforming it into a `SignatureVerifiedBlock`
/// and then using that implementation of `IntoFullyVerifiedBlock` to complete verification.
fn into_fully_verified_block(
self,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<FullyVerifiedBlock<T>, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
SignatureVerifiedBlock::new(self, chain)?.into_fully_verified_block(chain)
}
fn block(&self) -> &SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec> {
&self
}
}
impl<'a, T: BeaconChainTypes> FullyVerifiedBlock<'a, T> {
/// Instantiates `Self`, a wrapper that indicates that the given `block` is fully valid. See
/// the struct-level documentation for more information.
///
/// Note: this function does not verify block signatures, it assumes they are valid. Signature
/// verification must be done upstream (e.g., via a `SignatureVerifiedBlock`
///
/// Returns an error if the block is invalid, or if the block was unable to be verified.
pub fn from_signature_verified_components(
block: SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
block_root: Hash256,
parent: BeaconSnapshot<T::EthSpec>,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<Self, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
// Reject any block if its parent is not known to fork choice.
//
// A block that is not in fork choice is either:
//
// - Not yet imported: we should reject this block because we should only import a child
// after its parent has been fully imported.
// - Pre-finalized: if the parent block is _prior_ to finalization, we should ignore it
// because it will revert finalization. Note that the finalized block is stored in fork
// choice, so we will not reject any child of the finalized block (this is relevant during
// genesis).
if !chain
.fork_choice
.read()
.contains_block(&block.parent_root())
{
return Err(BlockError::ParentUnknown(Box::new(block)));
}
// Reject any block that exceeds our limit on skipped slots.
check_block_skip_slots(chain, &parent.beacon_block.message, &block.message)?;
/*
* Perform cursory checks to see if the block is even worth processing.
*/
check_block_relevancy(&block, Some(block_root), chain)?;
/*
* Advance the given `parent.beacon_state` to the slot of the given `block`.
*/
let catchup_timer = metrics::start_timer(&metrics::BLOCK_PROCESSING_CATCHUP_STATE);
// Keep a batch of any states that were "skipped" (block-less) in between the parent state
// slot and the block slot. These will be stored in the database.
let mut intermediate_states: Vec<StoreOp<T::EthSpec>> = Vec::new();
// The block must have a higher slot than its parent.
if block.slot() <= parent.beacon_state.slot {
return Err(BlockError::BlockIsNotLaterThanParent {
block_slot: block.slot(),
state_slot: parent.beacon_state.slot,
});
}
let mut summaries = vec![];
// Transition the parent state to the block slot.
let mut state = parent.beacon_state;
let distance = block.slot().as_u64().saturating_sub(state.slot.as_u64());
for i in 0..distance {
let state_root = if i == 0 {
parent.beacon_block.state_root()
} else {
// This is a new state we've reached, so stage it for storage in the DB.
// Computing the state root here is time-equivalent to computing it during slot
// processing, but we get early access to it.
let state_root = state.update_tree_hash_cache()?;
let op = if state.slot % T::EthSpec::slots_per_epoch() == 0 {
StoreOp::PutState(
state_root.into(),
Cow::Owned(state.clone_with(CloneConfig::committee_caches_only())),
)
} else {
StoreOp::PutStateSummary(
state_root.into(),
HotStateSummary::new(&state_root, &state)?,
)
};
intermediate_states.push(op);
state_root
};
if let Some(summary) = per_slot_processing(&mut state, Some(state_root), &chain.spec)? {
summaries.push(summary)
}
}
expose_participation_metrics(&summaries);
metrics::stop_timer(catchup_timer);
/*
* Build the committee caches on the state.
*/
let committee_timer = metrics::start_timer(&metrics::BLOCK_PROCESSING_COMMITTEE);
state.build_committee_cache(RelativeEpoch::Previous, &chain.spec)?;
state.build_committee_cache(RelativeEpoch::Current, &chain.spec)?;
metrics::stop_timer(committee_timer);
/*
* Perform `per_block_processing` on the block and state, returning early if the block is
* invalid.
*/
write_state(
&format!("state_pre_block_{}", block_root),
&state,
&chain.log,
);
write_block(&block, block_root, &chain.log);
let core_timer = metrics::start_timer(&metrics::BLOCK_PROCESSING_CORE);
if let Err(err) = per_block_processing(
&mut state,
&block,
Some(block_root),
// Signatures were verified earlier in this function.
BlockSignatureStrategy::NoVerification,
&chain.spec,
) {
match err {
// Capture `BeaconStateError` so that we can easily distinguish between a block
// that's invalid and one that caused an internal error.
BlockProcessingError::BeaconStateError(e) => return Err(e.into()),
other => return Err(BlockError::PerBlockProcessingError(other)),
}
};
metrics::stop_timer(core_timer);
/*
* Calculate the state root of the newly modified state
*/
let state_root_timer = metrics::start_timer(&metrics::BLOCK_PROCESSING_STATE_ROOT);
let state_root = state.update_tree_hash_cache()?;
metrics::stop_timer(state_root_timer);
write_state(
&format!("state_post_block_{}", block_root),
&state,
&chain.log,
);
/*
* Check to ensure the state root on the block matches the one we have calculated.
*/
if block.state_root() != state_root {
return Err(BlockError::StateRootMismatch {
block: block.state_root(),
local: state_root,
});
}
Ok(Self {
block,
block_root,
state,
parent_block: parent.beacon_block,
intermediate_states,
})
}
}
/// Check that the count of skip slots between the block and its parent does not exceed our maximum
/// value.
///
/// Whilst this is not part of the specification, we include this to help prevent us from DoS
/// attacks. In times of dire network circumstance, the user can configure the
/// `import_max_skip_slots` value.
fn check_block_skip_slots<T: BeaconChainTypes>(
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
parent: &BeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
block: &BeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
) -> Result<(), BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
// Reject any block that exceeds our limit on skipped slots.
if let Some(max_skip_slots) = chain.config.import_max_skip_slots {
if block.slot > parent.slot + max_skip_slots {
return Err(BlockError::TooManySkippedSlots {
parent_slot: parent.slot,
block_slot: block.slot,
});
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the block is later than the finalized slot on `chain`.
///
/// Returns an error if the block is earlier or equal to the finalized slot, or there was an error
/// verifying that condition.
fn check_block_against_finalized_slot<T: BeaconChainTypes>(
block: &BeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<(), BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
let finalized_slot = chain
.head_info()?
.finalized_checkpoint
.epoch
.start_slot(T::EthSpec::slots_per_epoch());
if block.slot <= finalized_slot {
Err(BlockError::WouldRevertFinalizedSlot {
block_slot: block.slot,
finalized_slot,
})
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
/// Returns `Ok(block)` if the block descends from the finalized root.
pub fn check_block_is_finalized_descendant<T: BeaconChainTypes, F: ForkChoiceStore<T::EthSpec>>(
block: SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
fork_choice: &ForkChoice<F, T::EthSpec>,
store: &HotColdDB<T::EthSpec, T::HotStore, T::ColdStore>,
) -> Result<SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
if fork_choice.is_descendant_of_finalized(block.parent_root()) {
Ok(block)
} else {
// If fork choice does *not* consider the parent to be a descendant of the finalized block,
// then there are two more cases:
//
// 1. We have the parent stored in our database. Because fork-choice has confirmed the
// parent is *not* in our post-finalization DAG, all other blocks must be either
// pre-finalization or conflicting with finalization.
// 2. The parent is unknown to us, we probably want to download it since it might actually
// descend from the finalized root.
if store
.item_exists::<SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>>(&block.parent_root())
.map_err(|e| BlockError::BeaconChainError(e.into()))?
{
Err(BlockError::NotFinalizedDescendant {
block_parent_root: block.parent_root(),
})
} else {
Err(BlockError::ParentUnknown(Box::new(block)))
}
}
}
/// Performs simple, cheap checks to ensure that the block is relevant to be imported.
///
/// `Ok(block_root)` is returned if the block passes these checks and should progress with
/// verification (viz., it is relevant).
///
/// Returns an error if the block fails one of these checks (viz., is not relevant) or an error is
/// experienced whilst attempting to verify.
pub fn check_block_relevancy<T: BeaconChainTypes>(
signed_block: &SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
block_root: Option<Hash256>,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<Hash256, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
let block = &signed_block.message;
// Do not process blocks from the future.
if block.slot > chain.slot()? {
return Err(BlockError::FutureSlot {
present_slot: chain.slot()?,
block_slot: block.slot,
});
}
// Do not re-process the genesis block.
if block.slot == 0 {
return Err(BlockError::GenesisBlock);
}
// This is an artificial (non-spec) restriction that provides some protection from overflow
// abuses.
if block.slot >= MAXIMUM_BLOCK_SLOT_NUMBER {
return Err(BlockError::BlockSlotLimitReached);
}
// Do not process a block from a finalized slot.
check_block_against_finalized_slot(block, chain)?;
let block_root = block_root.unwrap_or_else(|| get_block_root(&signed_block));
// Check if the block is already known. We know it is post-finalization, so it is
// sufficient to check the fork choice.
if chain.fork_choice.read().contains_block(&block_root) {
return Err(BlockError::BlockIsAlreadyKnown);
}
Ok(block_root)
}
/// Returns the canonical root of the given `block`.
///
/// Use this function to ensure that we report the block hashing time Prometheus metric.
pub fn get_block_root<E: EthSpec>(block: &SignedBeaconBlock<E>) -> Hash256 {
let block_root_timer = metrics::start_timer(&metrics::BLOCK_PROCESSING_BLOCK_ROOT);
let block_root = block.canonical_root();
metrics::stop_timer(block_root_timer);
block_root
}
/// Load the parent snapshot (block and state) of the given `block`.
///
/// Returns `Err(BlockError::ParentUnknown)` if the parent is not found, or if an error occurs
/// whilst attempting the operation.
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
fn load_parent<T: BeaconChainTypes>(
block: SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>,
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<(BeaconSnapshot<T::EthSpec>, SignedBeaconBlock<T::EthSpec>), BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
// Reject any block if its parent is not known to fork choice.
//
// A block that is not in fork choice is either:
//
// - Not yet imported: we should reject this block because we should only import a child
// after its parent has been fully imported.
// - Pre-finalized: if the parent block is _prior_ to finalization, we should ignore it
// because it will revert finalization. Note that the finalized block is stored in fork
// choice, so we will not reject any child of the finalized block (this is relevant during
// genesis).
if !chain
.fork_choice
.read()
.contains_block(&block.parent_root())
{
return Err(BlockError::ParentUnknown(Box::new(block)));
}
let db_read_timer = metrics::start_timer(&metrics::BLOCK_PROCESSING_DB_READ);
let result = if let Some(snapshot) = chain
.snapshot_cache
.try_write_for(BLOCK_PROCESSING_CACHE_LOCK_TIMEOUT)
.and_then(|mut snapshot_cache| snapshot_cache.try_remove(block.parent_root()))
{
Ok((snapshot, block))
} else {
// Load the blocks parent block from the database, returning invalid if that block is not
// found.
//
// We don't return a DBInconsistent error here since it's possible for a block to
// exist in fork choice but not in the database yet. In such a case we simply
// indicate that we don't yet know the parent.
let root = block.parent_root();
let parent_block = chain
.get_block(&block.parent_root())
.map_err(BlockError::BeaconChainError)?
.ok_or_else(|| {
// Return a `MissingBeaconBlock` error instead of a `ParentUnknown` error since
// we've already checked fork choice for this block.
//
// It's an internal error if the block exists in fork choice but not in the
// database.
BlockError::from(BeaconChainError::MissingBeaconBlock(block.parent_root()))
})?;
// Load the parent blocks state from the database, returning an error if it is not found.
// It is an error because if we know the parent block we should also know the parent state.
let parent_state_root = parent_block.state_root();
let parent_state = chain
.get_state(&parent_state_root, Some(parent_block.slot()))?
.ok_or_else(|| {
BeaconChainError::DBInconsistent(format!("Missing state {:?}", parent_state_root))
})?;
Ok((
BeaconSnapshot {
beacon_block: parent_block,
beacon_block_root: root,
beacon_state: parent_state,
beacon_state_root: parent_state_root,
},
block,
))
};
metrics::stop_timer(db_read_timer);
result
}
/// Performs a cheap (time-efficient) state advancement so the committees for `slot` can be
/// obtained from `state`.
///
/// The state advancement is "cheap" since it does not generate state roots. As a result, the
/// returned state might be holistically invalid but the committees will be correct (since they do
/// not rely upon state roots).
///
/// If the given `state` can already serve the `slot`, the committees will be built on the `state`
/// and `Cow::Borrowed(state)` will be returned. Otherwise, the state will be cloned, cheaply
/// advanced and then returned as a `Cow::Owned`. The end result is that the given `state` is never
/// mutated to be invalid (in fact, it is never changed beyond a simple committee cache build).
fn cheap_state_advance_to_obtain_committees<'a, E: EthSpec>(
state: &'a mut BeaconState<E>,
block_slot: Slot,
spec: &ChainSpec,
) -> Result<Cow<'a, BeaconState<E>>, BlockError<E>> {
let block_epoch = block_slot.epoch(E::slots_per_epoch());
if state.current_epoch() == block_epoch {
state.build_committee_cache(RelativeEpoch::Current, spec)?;
Ok(Cow::Borrowed(state))
} else if state.slot > block_slot {
Err(BlockError::BlockIsNotLaterThanParent {
block_slot,
state_slot: state.slot,
})
} else {
let mut state = state.clone_with(CloneConfig::committee_caches_only());
while state.current_epoch() < block_epoch {
// Don't calculate state roots since they aren't required for calculating
// shuffling (achieved by providing Hash256::zero()).
per_slot_processing(&mut state, Some(Hash256::zero()), spec).map_err(|e| {
BlockError::BeaconChainError(BeaconChainError::SlotProcessingError(e))
})?;
}
state.build_committee_cache(RelativeEpoch::Current, spec)?;
Ok(Cow::Owned(state))
}
}
/// Obtains a read-locked `ValidatorPubkeyCache` from the `chain`.
fn get_validator_pubkey_cache<T: BeaconChainTypes>(
chain: &BeaconChain<T>,
) -> Result<RwLockReadGuard<ValidatorPubkeyCache>, BlockError<T::EthSpec>> {
chain
.validator_pubkey_cache
.try_read_for(VALIDATOR_PUBKEY_CACHE_LOCK_TIMEOUT)
.ok_or_else(|| BeaconChainError::ValidatorPubkeyCacheLockTimeout)
.map_err(BlockError::BeaconChainError)
}
/// Produces an _empty_ `BlockSignatureVerifier`.
///
/// The signature verifier is empty because it does not yet have any of this block's signatures
/// added to it. Use `Self::apply_to_signature_verifier` to apply the signatures.
fn get_signature_verifier<'a, E: EthSpec>(
state: &'a BeaconState<E>,
validator_pubkey_cache: &'a ValidatorPubkeyCache,
spec: &'a ChainSpec,
) -> BlockSignatureVerifier<'a, E, impl Fn(usize) -> Option<Cow<'a, PublicKey>> + Clone> {
BlockSignatureVerifier::new(
state,
move |validator_index| {
// Disallow access to any validator pubkeys that are not in the current beacon
// state.
if validator_index < state.validators.len() {
validator_pubkey_cache
.get(validator_index)
.map(|pk| Cow::Borrowed(pk))
} else {
None
}
},
spec,
)
}
fn expose_participation_metrics(summaries: &[EpochProcessingSummary]) {
if !cfg!(feature = "participation_metrics") {
return;
}
for summary in summaries {
let b = &summary.total_balances;
metrics::maybe_set_float_gauge(
&metrics::PARTICIPATION_PREV_EPOCH_ATTESTER,
participation_ratio(b.previous_epoch_attesters(), b.previous_epoch()),
);
metrics::maybe_set_float_gauge(
&metrics::PARTICIPATION_PREV_EPOCH_TARGET_ATTESTER,
participation_ratio(b.previous_epoch_target_attesters(), b.previous_epoch()),
);
metrics::maybe_set_float_gauge(
&metrics::PARTICIPATION_PREV_EPOCH_HEAD_ATTESTER,
participation_ratio(b.previous_epoch_head_attesters(), b.previous_epoch()),
);
}
}
fn participation_ratio(section: u64, total: u64) -> Option<f64> {
// Reduce the precision to help ensure we fit inside a u32.
const PRECISION: u64 = 100_000_000;
let section: f64 = u32::try_from(section / PRECISION).ok()?.into();
let total: f64 = u32::try_from(total / PRECISION).ok()?.into();
if total > 0_f64 {
Some(section / total)
} else {
None
}
}
fn write_state<T: EthSpec>(prefix: &str, state: &BeaconState<T>, log: &Logger) {
if WRITE_BLOCK_PROCESSING_SSZ {
let root = state.tree_hash_root();
let filename = format!("{}_slot_{}_root_{}.ssz", prefix, state.slot, root);
let mut path = std::env::temp_dir().join("lighthouse");
let _ = fs::create_dir_all(path.clone());
path = path.join(filename);
match fs::File::create(path.clone()) {
Ok(mut file) => {
let _ = file.write_all(&state.as_ssz_bytes());
}
Err(e) => error!(
log,
"Failed to log state";
"path" => format!("{:?}", path),
"error" => format!("{:?}", e)
),
}
}
}
fn write_block<T: EthSpec>(block: &SignedBeaconBlock<T>, root: Hash256, log: &Logger) {
if WRITE_BLOCK_PROCESSING_SSZ {
let filename = format!("block_slot_{}_root{}.ssz", block.message.slot, root);
let mut path = std::env::temp_dir().join("lighthouse");
let _ = fs::create_dir_all(path.clone());
path = path.join(filename);
match fs::File::create(path.clone()) {
Ok(mut file) => {
let _ = file.write_all(&block.as_ssz_bytes());
}
Err(e) => error!(
log,
"Failed to log block";
"path" => format!("{:?}", path),
"error" => format!("{:?}", e)
),
}
}
}