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1d278aaa83
## Issue Addressed Implements support for importing and exporting the slashing protection DB interchange format described here: https://hackmd.io/@sproul/Bk0Y0qdGD Also closes #1584 ## Proposed Changes * [x] Support for serializing and deserializing the format * [x] Support for importing and exporting Lighthouse's database * [x] CLI commands to invoke import and export * [x] Export to minimal format (required when a minimal format has been previously imported) * [x] Tests for export to minimal (utilising mixed importing and attestation signing?) * [x] Tests for import/export of complete format, and import of minimal format * [x] ~~Prevent attestations with sources less than our max source (Danny's suggestion). Required for the fake attestation that we put in for the minimal format to block attestations from source 0.~~ * [x] Add the concept of a "low watermark" for compatibility with the minimal format Bonus! * [x] A fix to a potentially nasty bug involving validators getting re-registered each time the validator client ran! Thankfully, the ordering of keys meant that the validator IDs used for attestations and blocks remained stable -- otherwise we could have had some slashings on our hands! 😱 * [x] Tests to confirm that this bug is indeed vanquished
63 lines
2.3 KiB
Rust
63 lines
2.3 KiB
Rust
use crate::hash256_from_row;
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use types::{AttestationData, Epoch, Hash256, SignedRoot};
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/// An attestation that has previously been signed.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
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pub struct SignedAttestation {
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pub source_epoch: Epoch,
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pub target_epoch: Epoch,
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pub signing_root: Hash256,
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}
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/// Reasons why an attestation may be slashable (or invalid).
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#[derive(PartialEq, Debug)]
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pub enum InvalidAttestation {
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/// The attestation has the same target epoch as an attestation from the DB (enclosed).
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DoubleVote(SignedAttestation),
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/// The attestation surrounds an existing attestation from the database (`prev`).
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NewSurroundsPrev { prev: SignedAttestation },
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/// The attestation is surrounded by an existing attestation from the database (`prev`).
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PrevSurroundsNew { prev: SignedAttestation },
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/// The attestation is invalid because its source epoch is greater than its target epoch.
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SourceExceedsTarget,
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/// The attestation is invalid because its source epoch is less than the lower bound on source
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/// epochs for this validator.
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SourceLessThanLowerBound {
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source_epoch: Epoch,
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bound_epoch: Epoch,
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},
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/// The attestation is invalid because its target epoch is less than or equal to the lower
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/// bound on target epochs for this validator.
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TargetLessThanOrEqLowerBound {
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target_epoch: Epoch,
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bound_epoch: Epoch,
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},
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}
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impl SignedAttestation {
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pub fn new(source_epoch: Epoch, target_epoch: Epoch, signing_root: Hash256) -> Self {
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Self {
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source_epoch,
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target_epoch,
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signing_root,
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}
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}
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/// Create a `SignedAttestation` from attestation data and a domain.
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pub fn from_attestation(attestation: &AttestationData, domain: Hash256) -> Self {
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Self {
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source_epoch: attestation.source.epoch,
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target_epoch: attestation.target.epoch,
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signing_root: attestation.signing_root(domain),
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}
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}
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/// Create a `SignedAttestation` from an SQLite row of `(source, target, signing_root)`.
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pub fn from_row(row: &rusqlite::Row) -> rusqlite::Result<Self> {
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let source = row.get(0)?;
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let target = row.get(1)?;
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let signing_root = hash256_from_row(2, row)?;
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Ok(SignedAttestation::new(source, target, signing_root))
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}
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}
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