Files
lighthouse/validator_client/src/validator_store.rs
Paul Hauner 8bc82c573d Update local testnet scripts, fix eth1 sim (#1184)
* Update local testnet scripts

* Add logs when decrypting validators

* Update comment

* Update account manager

* Make random key generation explicit

* Remove unnecessary clap constraint

* Only decrypt voting keypair for eth1 deposit

* Use insecure kdf for insecure keypairs

* Simplify local testnet keygen

* Update local testnet

* Fix eth1 sim

* Add eth1 sim to CI again

* Remove old local testnet docs

* Tidy

* Remove checks for existing validators

* Tidy

* Fix typos
2020-05-26 18:30:44 +10:00

348 lines
12 KiB
Rust

use crate::config::SLASHING_PROTECTION_FILENAME;
use crate::{config::Config, fork_service::ForkService};
use parking_lot::RwLock;
use slashing_protection::{NotSafe, Safe, SlashingDatabase};
use slog::{crit, error, warn, Logger};
use slot_clock::SlotClock;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::iter::FromIterator;
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tempdir::TempDir;
use types::{
Attestation, BeaconBlock, ChainSpec, Domain, Epoch, EthSpec, Fork, Hash256, Keypair, PublicKey,
SelectionProof, Signature, SignedAggregateAndProof, SignedBeaconBlock, SignedRoot, Slot,
};
use validator_dir::{Manager as ValidatorManager, ValidatorDir};
struct LocalValidator {
validator_dir: ValidatorDir,
voting_keypair: Keypair,
}
/// We derive our own `PartialEq` to avoid doing equality checks between secret keys.
///
/// It's nice to avoid secret key comparisons from a security perspective, but it's also a little
/// risky when it comes to `HashMap` integrity (that's why we need `PartialEq`).
///
/// Currently, we obtain keypairs from keystores where we derive the `PublicKey` from a `SecretKey`
/// via a hash function. In order to have two equal `PublicKey` with different `SecretKey` we would
/// need to have either:
///
/// - A serious upstream integrity error.
/// - A hash collision.
///
/// It seems reasonable to make these two assumptions in order to avoid the equality checks.
impl PartialEq for LocalValidator {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.validator_dir == other.validator_dir
&& self.voting_keypair.pk == other.voting_keypair.pk
}
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ValidatorStore<T, E: EthSpec> {
validators: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, LocalValidator>>>,
slashing_protection: SlashingDatabase,
genesis_validators_root: Hash256,
spec: Arc<ChainSpec>,
log: Logger,
temp_dir: Option<Arc<TempDir>>,
fork_service: ForkService<T, E>,
_phantom: PhantomData<E>,
}
impl<T: SlotClock + 'static, E: EthSpec> ValidatorStore<T, E> {
pub fn load_from_disk(
config: &Config,
genesis_validators_root: Hash256,
spec: ChainSpec,
fork_service: ForkService<T, E>,
log: Logger,
) -> Result<Self, String> {
let slashing_db_path = config.data_dir.join(SLASHING_PROTECTION_FILENAME);
let slashing_protection =
SlashingDatabase::open_or_create(&slashing_db_path).map_err(|e| {
format!(
"Failed to open or create slashing protection database: {:?}",
e
)
})?;
let validator_key_values = ValidatorManager::open(&config.data_dir)
.map_err(|e| format!("unable to read data_dir: {:?}", e))?
.decrypt_all_validators(config.secrets_dir.clone(), Some(&log))
.map_err(|e| format!("unable to decrypt all validator directories: {:?}", e))?
.into_iter()
.map(|(kp, dir)| {
(
kp.pk.clone(),
LocalValidator {
validator_dir: dir,
voting_keypair: kp,
},
)
});
Ok(Self {
validators: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::from_iter(validator_key_values))),
slashing_protection,
genesis_validators_root,
spec: Arc::new(spec),
log,
temp_dir: None,
fork_service,
_phantom: PhantomData,
})
}
/// Register all known validators with the slashing protection database.
///
/// Registration is required to protect against a lost or missing slashing database,
/// such as when relocating validator keys to a new machine.
pub fn register_all_validators_for_slashing_protection(&self) -> Result<(), String> {
self.slashing_protection
.register_validators(self.validators.read().keys())
.map_err(|e| format!("Error while registering validators: {:?}", e))
}
pub fn voting_pubkeys(&self) -> Vec<PublicKey> {
self.validators
.read()
.iter()
.map(|(pubkey, _dir)| pubkey.clone())
.collect()
}
pub fn num_voting_validators(&self) -> usize {
self.validators.read().len()
}
fn fork(&self) -> Option<Fork> {
if self.fork_service.fork().is_none() {
error!(
self.log,
"Unable to get Fork for signing";
);
}
self.fork_service.fork()
}
pub fn randao_reveal(&self, validator_pubkey: &PublicKey, epoch: Epoch) -> Option<Signature> {
// TODO: check this against the slot clock to make sure it's not an early reveal?
self.validators
.read()
.get(validator_pubkey)
.and_then(|local_validator| {
let voting_keypair = &local_validator.voting_keypair;
let domain = self.spec.get_domain(
epoch,
Domain::Randao,
&self.fork()?,
self.genesis_validators_root,
);
let message = epoch.signing_root(domain);
Some(Signature::new(message.as_bytes(), &voting_keypair.sk))
})
}
pub fn sign_block(
&self,
validator_pubkey: &PublicKey,
block: BeaconBlock<E>,
current_slot: Slot,
) -> Option<SignedBeaconBlock<E>> {
// Make sure the block slot is not higher than the current slot to avoid potential attacks.
if block.slot > current_slot {
warn!(
self.log,
"Not signing block with slot greater than current slot";
"block_slot" => block.slot.as_u64(),
"current_slot" => current_slot.as_u64()
);
return None;
}
// Check for slashing conditions.
let fork = self.fork()?;
let domain = self.spec.get_domain(
block.epoch(),
Domain::BeaconProposer,
&fork,
self.genesis_validators_root,
);
let slashing_status = self.slashing_protection.check_and_insert_block_proposal(
validator_pubkey,
&block.block_header(),
domain,
);
match slashing_status {
// We can safely sign this block.
Ok(Safe::Valid) => {
let validators = self.validators.read();
let validator = validators.get(validator_pubkey)?;
let voting_keypair = &validator.voting_keypair;
Some(block.sign(
&voting_keypair.sk,
&fork,
self.genesis_validators_root,
&self.spec,
))
}
Ok(Safe::SameData) => {
warn!(
self.log,
"Skipping signing of previously signed block";
);
None
}
Err(NotSafe::UnregisteredValidator(pk)) => {
warn!(
self.log,
"Not signing block for unregistered validator";
"msg" => "Carefully consider running with --auto-register (see --help)",
"public_key" => format!("{:?}", pk)
);
None
}
Err(e) => {
crit!(
self.log,
"Not signing slashable block";
"error" => format!("{:?}", e)
);
None
}
}
}
pub fn sign_attestation(
&self,
validator_pubkey: &PublicKey,
validator_committee_position: usize,
attestation: &mut Attestation<E>,
current_epoch: Epoch,
) -> Option<()> {
// Make sure the target epoch is not higher than the current epoch to avoid potential attacks.
if attestation.data.target.epoch > current_epoch {
return None;
}
// Checking for slashing conditions.
let fork = self.fork()?;
let domain = self.spec.get_domain(
attestation.data.target.epoch,
Domain::BeaconAttester,
&fork,
self.genesis_validators_root,
);
let slashing_status = self.slashing_protection.check_and_insert_attestation(
validator_pubkey,
&attestation.data,
domain,
);
match slashing_status {
// We can safely sign this attestation.
Ok(Safe::Valid) => {
let validators = self.validators.read();
let validator = validators.get(validator_pubkey)?;
let voting_keypair = &validator.voting_keypair;
attestation
.sign(
&voting_keypair.sk,
validator_committee_position,
&fork,
self.genesis_validators_root,
&self.spec,
)
.map_err(|e| {
error!(
self.log,
"Error whilst signing attestation";
"error" => format!("{:?}", e)
)
})
.ok()?;
Some(())
}
Ok(Safe::SameData) => {
warn!(
self.log,
"Skipping signing of previously signed attestation"
);
None
}
Err(NotSafe::UnregisteredValidator(pk)) => {
warn!(
self.log,
"Not signing attestation for unregistered validator";
"msg" => "Carefully consider running with --auto-register (see --help)",
"public_key" => format!("{:?}", pk)
);
None
}
Err(e) => {
crit!(
self.log,
"Not signing slashable attestation";
"attestation" => format!("{:?}", attestation.data),
"error" => format!("{:?}", e)
);
None
}
}
}
/// Signs an `AggregateAndProof` for a given validator.
///
/// The resulting `SignedAggregateAndProof` is sent on the aggregation channel and cannot be
/// modified by actors other than the signing validator.
pub fn produce_signed_aggregate_and_proof(
&self,
validator_pubkey: &PublicKey,
validator_index: u64,
aggregate: Attestation<E>,
selection_proof: SelectionProof,
) -> Option<SignedAggregateAndProof<E>> {
let validators = self.validators.read();
let voting_keypair = &validators.get(validator_pubkey)?.voting_keypair;
Some(SignedAggregateAndProof::from_aggregate(
validator_index,
aggregate,
Some(selection_proof),
&voting_keypair.sk,
&self.fork()?,
self.genesis_validators_root,
&self.spec,
))
}
/// Produces a `SelectionProof` for the `slot`, signed by with corresponding secret key to
/// `validator_pubkey`.
pub fn produce_selection_proof(
&self,
validator_pubkey: &PublicKey,
slot: Slot,
) -> Option<SelectionProof> {
let validators = self.validators.read();
let voting_keypair = &validators.get(validator_pubkey)?.voting_keypair;
Some(SelectionProof::new::<E>(
slot,
&voting_keypair.sk,
&self.fork()?,
self.genesis_validators_root,
&self.spec,
))
}
}