N/A
1. In the batch retry logic, we were failing to set the batch state to `AwaitingDownload` before attempting a retry. This PR sets it to `AwaitingDownload` before the retry and sets it back to `Downloading` if the retry suceeded in sending out a request
2. Remove all peer scoring logic from retrying and rely on just de priorotizing the failed peer. I finally concede the point to @dapplion 😄
3. Changes `block_components_by_range_request` to accept `block_peers` and `column_peers`. This is to ensure that we use the full synced peerset for requesting columns in order to avoid splitting the column peers among multiple head chains. During forward sync, we want the block peers to be the peers from the syncing chain and column peers to be all synced peers from the peerdb.
Also, fixes a typo and calls `attempt_send_awaiting_download_batches` from more places
Co-Authored-By: Pawan Dhananjay <pawandhananjay@gmail.com>
Closes#6980
I think these flags may be useful in future peerdas / das testing, and would be useful to keep. Hence I've gated them behind a `testing` feature flag.
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
Addressing more review comments from:
- https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/8101
I've also tweaked a few more things that I think are minor bugs.
- Instrument `ensure_state_can_determine_proposers_for_epoch`
- Fix `block_root` usage in `compute_proposer_duties_from_head`. This was a regression introduced in 8101 😬 .
- Update the `state_advance_timer` to prime the next-epoch proposer cache post-Fulu.
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
This PR reverts #8179.
It turns out that the fix was invalid because an unknown root is always not a finalized descendant:
522bd9e9c6/consensus/proto_array/src/proto_array.rs (L976-L979)
so for any data columns with unknown parents, it will always penalise the gossip peer and disconnect it pretty quickly. On a small network, the node may lose all of its peers.
The impact is pretty obvious when the peer count is small and sync speed is slow, and is therefore easily reproducible by running a fresh supernode on devnet-3.
This isn't as obvious on a live testnet like holesky / sepolia, we haven't noticed this, probably due to its high peer count and sync speed - the nodes might be able to reach head quickly before losing too many peers.
The previous behaviour isn't ideal but safe: triggering unknown parent lookup and penalise the bad peer if it happens to be malicious or faulty. So for now it's safer to revert the change and plan for a proper fix after the v8 release.
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
#6853 Update store tests to cover data column pruning
Created a helper function `check_data_column_existence` which is a copy of `check_blob_existence` but checking data columns instead.
The helper function is then used to check whether data columns are also pruned when blobs are pruned if PeerDAS is enabled.
Co-Authored-By: SunnysidedJ <j@testinprod.io>
Co-Authored-By: Eitan Seri-Levi <eserilev@ucsc.edu>
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
N/A
Found this issue in sepolia. Note: the custody requirement for this node is 100.
```
Oct 14 11:25:40.053 DEBUG Reconstructed columns count: 28, block_root: 0x4d7946dec0ab59f2afd46610d7c54af555cb4c2851d9eea7d83dd17cf6e96aae, slot: 8725628
Oct 14 11:25:45.568 WARN Internal availability check failure block_root: 0x4d7946dec0ab59f2afd46610d7c54af555cb4c2851d9eea7d83dd17cf6e96aae, error: Unexpected("too many columns got 128 expected 100")
```
So if any of the block components arrives late, then we reconstruct all 128 columns and try to add it to da cache and have more columns than needed for availability in the cache.
There are 2 ways I can think of fixing this:
1. pass only the required columns to the da cache after reconstruction here 60df5f4ab6/beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/data_availability_checker.rs (L647-L648)
2. Ensure that we add only columns that we need to sample in the da cache. I think this is safer since we can add columns to the cache from multiple code paths and this fixes it at the source.
~~This PR implements (2).~~ Thought more about it, I think (1) is cleaner since we filter gossip and rpc columns also before calling `put_kzg_verified_data_columns`/
Co-Authored-By: Pawan Dhananjay <pawandhananjay@gmail.com>
Temporary stop gap for #7002
Downgrade light client errors to debug
We eventually should fix our light client objects so they can consist of data across forks.
Co-Authored-By: Eitan Seri- Levi <eserilev@gmail.com>
* Only persist custody columns
* Get claude to write tests
* lint
* Address review comments and fix tests.
* Use supernode only when building chain segments
* Clean up
* Rewrite tests.
* Fix tests
* Clippy
---------
Co-authored-by: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
This issue was identified during the fusaka audit competition.
The [`verify_parent_block_and_finalized_descendant`](62d9302e0f/beacon_node/beacon_chain/src/data_column_verification.rs (L606-L627)) in data column gossip verification currently load the parent first before checking if the column descends from the finalized root.
However, the `fork_choice.get_block(&block_parent_root)` function also make the same check internally:
8a4f6cf0d5/consensus/fork_choice/src/fork_choice.rs (L1242-L1249)
Therefore, if the column does not descend from the finalized root, we return an `UnknownParent` error, before hitting the `is_finalized_checkpoint_or_descendant` check just below.
Which means we `IGNORE` the gossip message instead `REJECT`, and the gossip peer is not _immediately_ penalised. This deviates from the spec.
However, worth noting that lighthouse will currently attempt to request the parent from this peer, and if the peer is not able to serve the parent, it gets penalised with a `LowToleranceError`, and will get banned after ~5 occurences.
ffa7b2b2b9/beacon_node/network/src/sync/network_context.rs (L1530-L1532)
This PR will penalise the bad peer immediately instead of performing block lookups before penalising it.
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
Closes:
- https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/4412
This should reduce Lighthouse's block proposal times on Holesky and prevent us getting reorged.
- [x] Allow the head state to be advanced further than 1 slot. This lets us avoid epoch processing on hot paths including block production, by having new epoch boundaries pre-computed and available in the state cache.
- [x] Use the finalized state to prune the op pool. We were previously using the head state and trying to infer slashing/exit relevance based on `exit_epoch`. However some exit epochs are far in the future, despite occurring recently.
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
N/A
Post fulu, we should be calling the v2 api on the relays that doesn't return the blobs/data columns.
However, we decided to start hitting the v2 api as soon as fulu is scheduled to avoid unexpected surprises at the fork.
In the ACDT call, it seems like most clients are calling v2 only after the fulu fork.
This PR aims to be the best of both worlds where we fallback to hitting v1 api if v2 fails. This way, we know beforehand if relays don't support it and can potentially alert them.
Co-Authored-By: Pawan Dhananjay <pawandhananjay@gmail.com>
@michaelsproul noticed this warning on a devnet-3 node
```
Oct 01 16:37:29.896 WARN Error when importing rpc custody columns error: ParentUnknown { parent_root: 0xe4cc85a2137b76eb083d7076255094a90f10caaec0afc8fd36807db742f6ff13 }, block_hash: 0x43ce63b2344990f5f4d8911b8f14e3d3b6b006edc35bbc833360e667df0edef7
```
We're also seeing similar `WARN` logs for blobs on our live nodes.
It's normal to get parent unknown in lookups and it's handled here
a134d43446/beacon_node/network/src/sync/block_lookups/mod.rs (L611-L619)
These shouldn't be a `WARN`, and we also log the same error in block lookups at `DEBUG` level here:
a134d43446/beacon_node/network/src/sync/block_lookups/mod.rs (L643-L648)
So i've removed these extra WARN logs.
I've also lower the level of an `ERROR` log when unable to serve data column root requests - it's unexpected, but is unlikely to impact the nodes performance, so I think we can downgrade this.
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
Follow-up to the bug fixed in:
- https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/8121
This fixes the root cause of that bug, which was introduced by me in:
- https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/8101
Lion identified the issue here:
- https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/8101#discussion_r2382710356
In the methods that compute the proposer shuffling decision root, ensure we don't use lookahead for the Fulu fork epoch itself. This is accomplished by checking if Fulu is enabled at `epoch - 1`, i.e. if `epoch > fulu_fork_epoch`.
I haven't updated the methods that _compute_ shufflings to use these new corrected bounds (e.g. `BeaconState::compute_proposer_indices`), although we could make this change in future. The `get_beacon_proposer_indices` method already gracefully handles the Fulu boundary case by using the `proposer_lookahead` field (if initialised).
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
N/A
In #8101 , when we modified the logic to get the proposer index post fulu, we seem to have missed advancing the state at the fork boundaries to get the right `Fork` for signature verification.
This led to lighthouse failing all gossip verification right after transitioning to fulu that was observed on the holesky shadow fork
```
Sep 26 14:24:00.088 DEBUG Rejected gossip block error: "InvalidSignature(ProposerSignature)", graffiti: "grandine-geth-super-1", slot: 640
Sep 26 14:24:00.099 WARN Could not verify block for gossip. Rejecting the block error: InvalidSignature(ProposerSignature)
```
I'm not completely sure this is the correct fix, but this fixes the issue with `InvalidProposerSignature` on the holesky shadow fork.
Thanks to @eserilev for helping debug this
Co-Authored-By: Pawan Dhananjay <pawandhananjay@gmail.com>
As identified by a researcher during the Fusaka security competition, we were computing the proposer index incorrectly in some places by computing without lookahead.
- [x] Add "low level" checks to computation functions in `consensus/types` to ensure they error cleanly
- [x] Re-work the determination of proposer shuffling decision roots, which are now fork aware.
- [x] Re-work and simplify the beacon proposer cache to be fork-aware.
- [x] Optimise `with_proposer_cache` to use `OnceCell`.
- [x] All tests passing.
- [x] Resolve all remaining `FIXME(sproul)`s.
- [x] Unit tests for `ProtoBlock::proposer_shuffling_root_for_child_block`.
- [x] End-to-end regression test.
- [x] Test on pre-Fulu network.
- [x] Test on post-Fulu network.
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
- PR https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/8045 introduced a regression of how lookup sync interacts with the da_checker.
Now in unstable block import from the HTTP API also insert the block in the da_checker while the block is being execution verified. If lookup sync finds the block in the da_checker in `NotValidated` state it expects a `GossipBlockProcessResult` message sometime later. That message is only sent after block import in gossip.
I confirmed in our node's logs for 4/4 cases of stuck lookups are caused by this sequence of events:
- Receive block through API, insert into da_checker in fn process_block in put_pre_execution_block
- Create lookup and leave in AwaitingDownload(block in processing cache) state
- Block from HTTP API finishes importing
- Lookup is left stuck
Closes https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/8104
- https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/8110 was my initial solution attempt but we can't send the `GossipBlockProcessResult` event from the `http_api` crate without adding new channels, which seems messy.
For a given node it's rare that a lookup is created at the same time that a block is being published. This PR solves https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/8104 by allowing lookup sync to import the block twice in that case.
Co-Authored-By: dapplion <35266934+dapplion@users.noreply.github.com>
#8105 (to be confirmed)
I noticed a large number of failed discovery requests after deploying latest `unstable` to some of our testnet and mainnet nodes. This is because of a recent PeerDAS change to attempt to maintain sufficient peers across data column subnets - this shouldn't be enabled on network without peerdas scheduled, otherwise it will keep retrying discovery on these subnets and never succeed.
Also removed some unused files.
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jimmy@sigmaprime.io>
Ensure that we don't log a warning for HTTP 202s, which are expected on the blinded block endpoints after Fulu.
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
This PR consolidates the `reqresp_pre_import_cache` into the `data_availability_checker` for the following reasons:
- the `reqresp_pre_import_cache` suffers from the same TOCTOU bug we had with `data_availability_checker` earlier, and leads to unbounded memory leak, which we have observed over the last 6 months on some nodes.
- the `reqresp_pre_import_cache` is no longer necessary, because we now hold blocks in the `data_availability_checker` for longer since (#7961), and recent blocks can be served from the DA checker.
This PR also maintains the following functionalities
- Serving pre-executed blocks over RPC, and they're now served from the `data_availability_checker` instead.
- Using the cache for de-duplicating lookup requests.
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jimmy@sigmaprime.io>
Part of #7866
- Continuation of #7921
In the above PR, we enabled rayon for batch KZG verification in chain segment processing. However, using the global rayon thread pool for backfill is likely to create resource contention with higher-priority beacon processor work.
This PR introduces a dedicated low-priority rayon thread pool `LOW_PRIORITY_RAYON_POOL` and uses it for processing backfill chain segments.
This prevents backfill KZG verification from using the global rayon thread pool and competing with high-priority beacon processor tasks for CPU resources.
However, this PR by itself doesn't prevent CPU oversubscription because other tasks could still fill up the global rayon thread pool, and having an extra thread pool could make things worse. To address this we need the beacon
processor to coordinate total CPU allocation across all tasks, which is covered in:
- #7789
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Eitan Seri- Levi <eserilev@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Eitan Seri-Levi <eserilev@ucsc.edu>
Address contention on the store's `block_cache` by allowing it to be disabled when `--block-cache-size 0` is provided, and also making this the default.
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
A different (and complementary) approach for:
- https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/5391
This PR adds a flag to set the DA boundary to the Deneb fork. The effect of this change is that Lighthouse will try to backfill _all_ blobs.
Most peers do not have this data, but I'm thinking that combined with `trusted-peers` this could be quite effective.
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
Fix a memory leak in the reprocess queue.
If the vec of attestation IDs for a block is never evicted from the reprocess queue by a `BlockImported` event, then it stays in the map forever consuming memory. The fix is to remove the entry when its last attestation times out. We do similarly for light client updates.
In practice this will only occur if there is a race between adding an attestation to the queue and processing the `BlockImported` event, or if there are attestations for block roots that we never import (e.g. random block roots, block roots of invalid blocks).
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
Lookup sync has a cache of block roots "failed_chains". If a peer triggers a lookup for a block or descendant of a root in failed_chains the lookup is dropped and the peer penalized. However blocks are inserted into failed_chains for a single reason:
- If a chain is longer than 32 blocks the lookup is dropped to prevent OOM risks. However the peer is not at fault, since discovering an unknown chain longer than 32 blocks is not malicious. We just drop the lookup to sync the blocks from range forward sync.
This discrepancy is probably an oversight when changing old code. Before we used to add blocks that failed too many times to process to that cache. However, we don't do that anymore. Adding a block that fails too many times to process is an optimization to save resources in rare cases where peers keep sending us invalid blocks. In case that happens, today we keep trying to process the block, downscoring the peers and eventually disconnecting them. _IF_ we found that optimization to be necessary we should merge this PR (_Stricter match of BlockError in lookup sync_) first. IMO we are fine without the failed_chains cache and the ignored_chains cache will be obsolete with [tree sync](https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/7678) as the OOM risk of long lookup chains does not exist anymore.
Closes https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/issues/7577
Rename `failed_chains` for `ignored_chains` and don't penalize peers that trigger lookups for those blocks
Co-Authored-By: dapplion <35266934+dapplion@users.noreply.github.com>
Attempt to address performance issues caused by importing the same block multiple times.
- Check fork choice "after" obtaining the fork choice write lock in `BeaconChain::import_block`. We actually use an upgradable read lock, but this is semantically equivalent (the upgradable read has the advantage of not excluding regular reads).
The hope is that this change has several benefits:
1. By preventing duplicate block imports we save time repeating work inside `import_block` that is unnecessary, e.g. writing the state to disk. Although the store itself now takes some measures to avoid re-writing diffs, it is even better if we avoid a disk write entirely.
2. By returning `DuplicateFullyImported`, we reduce some duplicated work downstream. E.g. if multiple threads importing columns trigger `import_block`, now only _one_ of them will get a notification of the block import completing successfully, and only this one will run `recompute_head`. This should help avoid a situation where multiple beacon processor workers are consumed by threads blocking on the `recompute_head_lock`. However, a similar block-fest is still possible with the upgradable fork choice lock (a large number of threads can be blocked waiting for the first thread to complete block import).
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
#7697
If we're three seconds into the current slot just trigger reconstruction. I don't know what the correct reconstruction deadline number is, but it should probably be at least half a second before the attestation deadline
Co-Authored-By: Eitan Seri- Levi <eserilev@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Eitan Seri-Levi <eserilev@ucsc.edu>
I was looking into some long `PendingComponents` span and noticed the block event wasn't added to the span, so it wasn't possible to see when the block was added from the trace view, this PR fixes this.
<img width="637" height="430" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/65040b1c-11e7-43ac-951b-bdfb34b665fb" />
Additionally I've noticed a lot of noises and confusion in sync logs due to the initial`peer_id` being included as part of the syncing chain span, causing all logs under the span to have that `peer_id`, which may not be accurate for some sync logs, I've removed `peer_id` from the `SyncingChain` span, and also cleaned up a bunch of spans to use `%` (display) for slots and epochs to make logs easier to read.
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
Since we re-enabled HTTP API tests on CI (https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/pull/7943) there have been a few spurious failures:
- https://github.com/sigp/lighthouse/actions/runs/17608432465/job/50024519938?pr=7783
That error is awkward, but running locally with a short timeout confirms it to be a timeout.
Change the request timeout to 5s everywhere. We had kept it shorter to try to detect performance regressions, but I think this is better suited to being done with metrics & traces. On CI we really just want things to pass reliably without flakiness, so I think a longer timeout to handle slower test code (like mock-builder) and overworked CI boxes makes sense.
Co-Authored-By: Michael Sproul <michael@sigmaprime.io>
Anchor currently depends on `lighthouse_network` for a few types and utilities that live within. As we use our own libp2p behaviours, we actually do not use the core logic in that crate. This makes us transitively depend on a bunch of unneeded crates (even a whole separate libp2p if the versions mismatch!)
Move things we require into it's own lightweight crate.
Co-Authored-By: Daniel Knopik <daniel@dknopik.de>
#7950
Skip column gossip verification logic during block production as its redundant and potentially computationally expensive.
Co-Authored-By: Eitan Seri- Levi <eserilev@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Eitan Seri-Levi <eserilev@ucsc.edu>
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jimmy@sigmaprime.io>
Co-Authored-By: Jimmy Chen <jchen.tc@gmail.com>
